The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The Whaling Moratorium and Divergent Interpretations of Science by Harris, A. W.
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 4
The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The
Whaling Moratorium and Divergent
Interpretations of Science
A. W. Harris
Copyright c 2005 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
A. W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The Whaling Moratorium and Divergent
Interpretations of Science, 29 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 375 (2005),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol29/iss2/4
THE BEST SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE:
THE WHALING MORATORIUM AND DIVERGENT
INTERPRETATIONS OF SCIENCE
A. W. HARRIS*
I. CONTRASTING INFERENCES
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment ("UNCHE"), otherwise known simply as the Stockholm
Conference, issued a report of conference activities, which included
the statement that there was a "need for a common outlook and for
common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the world in
the preservation and enhancement of the human environment."'
The Stockholm Conference was prompted by the strength of two
resolutions issued by the United Nations Economic and Social
Council ("ECOSOC") and the General Assembly in 1968.2
One of the conference committees, Committee Two, was
charged with evaluating the condition of whale stocks globally and
later offered a recommendation.
[Conference] Committee Two on "The Environmental As-
pects of Natural Resource Management" considered the
* Professor, Department of Government & Politics, Humboldt State University.
In other areas of natural resource law, the author has written in the areas of
Antarctica and climate change, as well as living marine resources. He has also
worked in the area of ethnicity and nationalism. The author extends his deep
appreciation to Shannon West, Stephen Del Percio, and anonymous reviewers,
for their helpful comments, diligence, and assistance. Special thanks to Allison
Hatchett, and to the entire editorial staff of the William and Mary Environ-
mental Law and Policy Review for their patience and endurance.
'Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1972) [hereinafter U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment].
2 The first resolution was from the Economic and Social Council, E.S.C. Res.
1346, U.N. ESCOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 8, (1968). The second resolution
came from the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 2398, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp.
No. 18, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). See 1 PATRICIA BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF WHALING 365, n.4 (1985).
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state of the whale stocks and recommended a ten year
moratorium on commercial whaling to permit the whales'
recovery. The UNCHE Report records that Japan opposed
this in Committee, saying that their scientists had
advised that such dramatic and emotional gestures were
unjustified. The Netherlands, however, stated that their
scientists had advised that it was necessary. The resolu-
tion was carried in Committee by a vote of fifty two in
favour and three against; when presented to the Plenary
Session it was again carried, by a vote of fifty three in
favour and none against, but there were twelve absten-
tions. Japan abstained stating this time that "while it was
favourable to a moratorium on commercial whaling, it
had abstained in the vote because the whole question was
to be considered by the International Whaling Commis-
sion on the basis of available scientific information."3
The Stockholm Conference also issued Recommendation 33, which
suggested "that Governments agree to strengthen the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, to increase international research
efforts, and as a matter of urgency to call for an international
agreement, under the auspices of the International Whaling
3 1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 365 (emphasis in original). The recommendation
referred to in this quote is Recommendation 86 from U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment, supra note 1, at 191. It is often noted that the
Stockholm Conference served as a kind of "watershed" event in terms of gener-
ally raising the international community's awareness regarding environmental
degradation and natural resource conservation issues. In particular, it directed
attention toward the apparent decline in abundance of particular whale species.
See Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to
Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L. 21, 39 (1991). "In sum, the Stockholm Conference may
be seen as marking a pivotal point between conservationism and protectionism.
." There are a number of reasons for this belief, one of them being how
UNCHE led to the establishment of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme ("UNEP"), a permanent body. 1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 371. Birnie's
extended discussion of UNCHE gives a similar impression. See id. at 364-75.
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Commission and involving all Governments concerned, for a 10-
year moratorium on commercial whaling."4
The International Whaling Commission ("IWC")5 first consi-
dered a whaling moratorium in 1973, when the United States
proposed a ten-year moratorium before IWC's Technical Commit-
tee.6 At that meeting, the Technical Committee rejected the
moratorium proposal, partly because of an opinion from IWC's
Scientific Committee, which took the position "that a blanket
moratorium on whaling could not be justified scientifically, since
prudent management required regulation of the stocks."' Rather
than a moratorium, the Scientific Committee proposed "a decade
of intensified research on cetaceans and that this should proceed
in parallel with further development of the policy of bringing catch
restrictions into line with the best available knowledge of the
stage of the stocks."'
The debate over the wisdom of a moratorium on commercial
whaling continued within IWC, particularly within two of its more
important organs, the Scientific Committee and the Technical
Committee.9 Part of the debate rested on the issue of uncertainty.
"The ICRW required the IWC to fix quotas and make regulations
based on 'scientific findings.' The [Scientific Committee] was
beginning to discover that it could not make such findings in view
of the lack of data on many stocks and sub-stocks and of new
4 Recommendation 33, U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, supra note
1, at 12. See 1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 368.
'Governments agreed to establish the International Whaling Commission at the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling ("ICRW"). See
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, art. 3, 62
Stat. 1716, 1717, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, 76-78 [hereinafter ICRW]. Article V of ICRW
specifies that IWC is to adopt "regulations with respect to the conservation and
utilization of whale resources." ICRW, art. V(1), at 80. In the United States, the
Convention was established by the Whaling Convention Act of 1949, 16 U.S.C.
§ 916 (1988).
6 See Chairman's Report of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting, 24 REP. INT'L WHALING
COMM'N 24-25 (1973) [hereinafter IWC, Twenty-Fourth Meeting]. See also 1
BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 422.
7 IWC, Twenty-Fourth Meeting, supra note 6, at 24.
8 Id. at 25.
9 See, e.g., 1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 422-23, 484-85.
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theories of population dynamics." ° After 1972, the debate within
IWC "evolved" in character as IWC membership expanded, and it
is difficult to ascertain whether there was a single IWC meeting in
which the moratorium debate did not occur in one form or
another." By 1979, IWC membership had expanded from its
original twelve to twenty-three. 2 During the 1970s, "the tide
began to turn in favor of whale conservation, when political
attitudes toward whales began to change and a new concern for
global ecology began to take root."13 In 1979, both the United
States and Australia introduced proposals for some type of ban on
whaling, with the United States' proposal urging a worldwide ban
on commercial whaling.'4 Both countries indicated that their
proposals were motivated by a concern for the survival of certain
species of the "great whales." 5
'
0 Id. at 485.
11 For a detailed discussion of these years within IWC, and the continuing debate
between particular IWC organs such as the Scientific Committee and the
general IWC membership, see ROBERT BURTON, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF WHALES
(2d ed. 1980).
12 1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 504.
1" Howard S. Schiffman, The Protection of Whales in International Law: A
Perspective for the Next Century, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 315 (1996).
14 1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 505.
"5 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 3, at 42 & n.139 (citing a letter to IWC from
the President of the United States, which was part of the opening statement
from the United States' delegation to the 1979 IWC meeting). See generally
Chairman's Report of the Thirty-First Annual Meeting, 32 REP. INT'L WHALING
COMM'N. 26 (1980). Except for the sperm whale (Physeter macrocephalus), which
is a member of the sub-order Odontoceti (toothed whales or ordontocetes), the
"great whales" all stem from the sub-order Mysticeti (baleen whales or
mysticetes). See 1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 13. The baleen whales, generally
labeled as great whales, include the sei whale (Balaenoptera borealis), Bryde's
whale (Balaenoptera edeni), the blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus), the fin
whale (Balaenopteraphysalus), the humpback whale (Megaptera novaeangliae),
and the gray whale (Eschrichtius robustus). See id. at 13. See also 2 PATRICIA
BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OFWHALING 665-67 (1985). The two species
of minke whale, the common minke (Balaenoptera acutoros trata), and the
Antarctic minke (Balaenoptera bonaerensis), are also baleen whales, but are not
traditionally grouped with the "great whales" because of their smaller size. See
1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 14; 2 BIRNIE, supra, at 666-67. The minke whale has
been heavily pursued in recent years by the Japanese, who engage in scientific
378
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Neither proposal was fully accepted by IWC, but a certain
"momentum"6 had been established in part because pelagic
whaling (the hunting of whales by factory ships) had been
prohibited at the 1979 meeting.' 7 For the purpose of this Article,
the most important issue regarding the shift within IWC toward
what has been termed "protectionism"'8 is that it was chiefly
motivated by uncertainty over species abundance. In 1981,
President Reagan addressed this issue in a letter to IWC in which
he indicated "the concern of the U.S. government regarding the
insufficient data on whale stocks."' 9
Finally, in an action that could only occur due to its expansion
in membership, IWC passed a resolution in 1982, establishing an
indefinite global moratorium on all commercial whaling.2 ° The key
whaling, and the Norwegians, who engage in commercial whaling. See infra Part
II.B. Both countries believe that the relative greater abundance of the two
species of minke whale make it unlikely that the taking of a limited number of
individuals from the present stocks would pose a threat of endangering either
species. See id.
16 2 BIRNIE, supra note 15, at 600.
17 Id. at 601.
18 D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 3, at 40-48.
'9 Schiffman, supra note 13, at 318 & n.69 (citing President's Message to the
International Whaling Commission, 1981 PUB. PAPERs 634 (July 17, 1981)).20 Id. at 317. For an extended discussion of how the nature of IWC membership
expansion helped to bring about an "ideological" change in IWC, refer to a series
of articles written by Patricia Birnie from 1980 through 1982. See generally
Patricia Birnie, IWC - Survival and Growth, 4 MARINE POL'Y 72-75 (1980), IWC -
Bargaining and Compromise, 5 MARINE POLY 79-84 (1981), and 33d Meeting of
the International Whaling Commission, Brighton, U.K, 6 MARINE POL'Y 74-76
(1982).
In recent years there has been a fresh acceleration in IWC's acquisition of
new members. Some observers suggest that these new members may be
assisting in promoting a second "ideological" shift. See Maria Clara Maffei, The
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 12 INT'L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 287, 297 n.33 and accompanying text (1997). The direction of the
growing shift in sentiment is away from the conservation or preservation of
whales, and toward sustainable exploitation of "healthy stocks" of certain whale
species. See Robert L. Friedheim, Moderation in the Pursuit: Explaining Japan's
Failure in the International Whaling Negotiations, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.
349, 366 (1996). This "transition" is not currently significant enough to overturn
the moratorium, which could require an affirmative vote by a three-fourths
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majority of the membership. See Kate O'Connell, Conservation vs. Whaling
Heats Up at Annual IWC Meeting, 2 Spyhopper (ACS Newsletter, 1998),
available at http://www.acsonline.org/publications/spyhopper/spy9802. html. See
also Maffei, supra, at 297. For specificity on the procedure to amend the
Schedule to ICRW, which is where the moratorium is located, see ICRW, supra
note 5, art. III, 62 Stat. at 1717, 161 U.N.T.S. at 76-78, and art. V, 62 Stat. at
1719, 161 U.N.T.S. at 80-82. By the spring of 2002, however, the shift had
gathered strength sufficient to temporarily block the renewal of an aboriginal
quota for the taking of bowhead whales (Balaena mysticetus) by U.S. Alaskan
Inuit during IWC's annual meeting in Shimonoseki, Japan. See Press Release,
International Whaling Commission, Final Press Release of 54th Annual Meeting
in Shimonoseki, Japan (May 2002), at http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/
meeting2002.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Japan Meeting].
This bowhead quota, which was to be extended for five years, was long-
standing, and the failure to renew it was a distinct break from recent tradition.
See James Brooke, World Briefing Asia: Japan: Conflict at Whaling Meeting,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at A6. At the same time, an overall quota of 500 gray
whales (Eschrichtius robustus) from the Eastern Pacific stock, was sustained by
IWC for the Chukotka people, a Russian indigenous group, and the Makah, an
indigenous group residing on the western coast of the United States. This quota
for the gray whale was established in 1997, with 120 whales allocated annually
for the Chukotka, and up to four whales allocated annually for the Makah. See
Chairman's Report of the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting, 48 REP. INT'L WHALING
COMM'N 28-30 (1998).
Traditional practice was restored at a Special IWC Inter-Sessional Meeting
in October 2002 at Cambridge, England. At that meeting, the United States
and the Russian Federation obtained what they had originally sought at the
regular IWC meeting at Shimonseki: an overall quota of 280 bowhead whales
over a period of five years, "with no more than 67 whales struck in any year."
Final Press Release, International Whaling Commission, Special Meeting in
Cambridge, UK (Oct. 2002), at http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/specmeeting
2002.htm [hereinafter Special Meeting Press Release]. With evident satisfaction,
the United States took express note of the decision by Japan to not orchestrate
opposition against a renewal of the bowhead quota on the occasion of the
October 2002 Special Meeting. "[W] e're pleased that Japan, which acted to block
the subsistence quota at the annual meeting last May, did not oppose the five-
year quota at this meeting...." Richard Boucher, Daily Press Briefing, U.S.
Dep't of State, (Oct. 15, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/14403
pf.htm. No actual "vote" on this issue took place at the Special Meeting because
the decision was made by consensus, which followed tradition on decisions
regarding aboriginal subsistence whaling. See Special Meeting Press Release,
supra. During the Special Meeting, the United States spoke in favor of a long-
standing Japanese request for IWC permission to institute a coastal whaling
program. Boucher, supra. The request, however, was voted down by the
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paragraph of the resolution reads:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10 [of
the ICRW Schedule], catch limits for the killing for
commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the
1986 coastal and 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter
shall be zero. This provision will be kept under review,
based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the
latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive
assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks
and consider modification of this provision and the
establishment of other catch limits.
21
The 1982 moratorium was written to take effect in 1986 in
order to allow states with sizeable commercial whaling industries
to make preparations for the economic consequences of the ban.
Immediately following the passage of the moratorium, objections
were filed by Japan, Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union.22 The
Commission. Id. Some commentators have highlighted this action because in
past IWC meetings the United States had voted against the same Japanese
request. See id. The United States has denied any linkage between the absence
of Japanese opposition to the renewal of the bowhead quota on the one hand,
and the absence of United States opposition to the IWC permitting coastal
whaling on the other. See id.
Some observers attributed the break with tradition that occurred at the
fifty-fourth regular IWC meeting to the new members' belief that the national
whaling industries should exist. See Doug Struck, Japan Rebuffed in Fight to
Ease Ban on Whaling, WASH. POST, May 23, 2002, at A16. Japan may have
"recruited" a certain proportion of the new IWC members that have less than a
direct interest in whaling by offering them economic assistance. Id. It has been
alleged there is a quid pro quo attached to these economic inducements; Japan
has pressured the newly recruited countries to support its key votes within the
Commission. See id; see also Boucher, supra.
21 Chairman's Report of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting, 33 REP. INT'L
WHALING COMM'N 20, 21 (1983) [hereinafter IWC, Thirty-Fourth Annual
Meeting]. The full text of the moratorium, produced in resolution form, can be
found in Marian N. Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 431, 435-36 n.4 (1985).
22 The vote on the moratorium resolution was twenty-five in favor and seven
against, with five abstentions. See IWC, Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting, supra
note 21, at 21 (1983). Countries voting in support were Antigua, Australia,
2005] 381
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objection procedure within IWC has been referred to as an "opt
out" provision,23 because it allows countries in disagreement with
a stated action or policy to exempt themselves from an obligation
to abide by that action or policy.24 The dissenting country merely
has to file an objection in written form with IWC in a prompt
fashion.25 There are two exceptions to the whaling ban allowed by
the moratorium: whaling for scientific reasons and whaling for
aboriginal subsistence.2" Each of these exceptions has been subject
to much criticism from a number of observers."
This Article argues that, although the motivations for the
moratorium are grounded in empirical evidence, its continuance
has brought much dispute between parties that disagree with
Belize, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
India, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Senegal, the
Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Those
voting against were Brazil, Iceland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, Peru,
the Soviet Union, with Chile, China, the Philippines, and South Africa
abstaining. See id. at 20-21.
23 See Judith Berger-Eforo, Note, Sanctuary for the Whales: Will This Be the
Demise of the International Whaling Commission or a Viable Strategy for the
Twenty-First Century?, 8 PACE INT'L L. REV. 439, 462 n.141 (1996).
24 See ICRW, supra note 5, art. V(3), 62 Stat. at 1719, 161 U.N.T.S. at 80-82.
25 Id. art. V(3), 62 Stat. at 1719, 161 U.N.T.S. at 80-82.
26 Permission to take whales for scientific research purposes is provided by the
Convention itself.
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention, any
Contracting government may grant to any of its nationals a special
permit authorizing that national to kill, take, and treat whales for
purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to
number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting
Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales
in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from
the operation of this Convention.
Id. art VIII(l), 62 Stat. at 1719-20, 161 U.N.T.S. at 82-83. IWC's authority for
granting an aboriginal exemption is derived from the Schedule of the
Convention on Whaling and has been in place since its inception. The Schedule
states that "[it is forbidden to take or kill gray whales or right whales, except
when the meat and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for local
consumption by the aborigines." ICRW, supra note 5, sched. 2, 62 Stat. at
1723, 161 U.N.T.S. at 90-9 1.
27 See infra Part II.
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respect to both the scientific (biological) bases and the varying
evaluations of environmental risk. The dispute between whaling
advocates and whaling opponents rests in part on the proper
application of the precautionary principle to the whaling issue. The
precautionary principle is designed to minimize risk; this Article
will show how parties to the whaling dispute have arrived at
different conclusions regarding an acceptable level of risk, based
on their preferences for variations of the precautionary principle.
A. Exceptions
Criticism of the scientific research exception has been based
in part on the belief that the number of whales that must be
sacrificed in the name of research may be smaller than the current
number taken by Japan, which is the only IWC member country
currently conducting whale hunts for scientific purposes. 28 This
criticism contains at least two independent complaints. The first
strongly suggests that the total number of whales of various
species now being taken for research greatly exceeds the number
necessary in order to gather sufficient tissue samples for scientific
tests.29 The second view holds that individual whales need not be
sacrificed at all in the interests of research-that is, it may be
distinctly possible to conduct viable research on whales in a non-
lethal manner.3" Since 1987, IWC has annually and routinely
condemned and requested the cessation of scientific whaling
28 See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 3, at 48 n.192; William C. Bums, The
International Whaling Commission and the Future of Cetaceans: Problems &
Prospects, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 31, 48-53 (1997) (recounting the
history of research whaling by Norway, Ireland, and Japan). See also Schiffman,
supra note 13, at 328 (noting that Ireland has withdrawn from IWC and Norway
continues to rely on its original objection to the moratorium, in addition to the
research exception).29 See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 3, at 48 n. 192.
30 IWC itself has asserted that non-lethal research techniques may now have
progressed to a point where a state interested in whale research would have to
demonstrate why it could not carry out the research in a non-lethal manner. See
Chairman's Report of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting, 36 REP. INT'L
WHALING COMM'N 25 (1987). See also Chairman's Report of the Forty-Seventh
Annual Meeting, 46 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 35 (1995).
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whenever a state has issued permits to its nationals.3 ' In 1994,
IWC passed a resolution banning all scientific whaling within
the bounds of what is termed the "Antarctic sanctuary," a "safe"
harbor for whales declared by IWC the same year.32 Japan has
virtually ignored the prohibition by continuing to take whales,
primarily minke (Balaenoptera bonaerensis), within the Southern
Ocean Sanctuary area.3 3 Japan has also recently initiated a
research project in which it has proclaimed a need to take individu-
als from two species, sperm (Physeter macrocephalus) and Bryde's
(Balaenoptera edeni), which have not been subject to scientifically
motivated hunting since the moratorium went into effect in
1986.34 Japan's decision to begin taking sperm and Bryde's whales
provoked the U. S. Secretary of Commerce to certify that such
31 See generally Burns, supra note 28, at 45-53 (chronicling IWC's efforts since
1987).
32 See generally Chairman's Report of the Forty-Fifth Annual Meeting, 44 REP.
INT'L WHALING COMM'N 11, 20-23 (1994) (discussing the creation of the Antarctic
Sanctuary, also referred to as the Southern Ocean Sanctuary).
" See generally Annual Meetings, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, at http://www.iwc
office.rg/meetings/meetingsmain.htm (last visited Jan. 25,2005) (collecting press
releases and resolution texts that condemn Japan's research whaling in the
Antarctic). IWC regularly passes resolutions urging Japan to stop issuing
permits for scientific research generally, but especially for taking whales within
the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. See, e.g., Resolution on Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whales and Special Permit Whaling, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, at http://
www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolution2003.htm#3 (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
Regarding scientific permits, IWC has stated that
[tihe issuance of such permits is a sovereign right under the
Convention. The Commission adopted a Resolution calling on the
Government of Japan to refrain from issuing these permits and
reiterated that in reviewing scientific permits, the Scientific
Committee should examine whether the research is required for
management or could be carried out using non-lethal means.
Press Release, International Whaling Commission, 50th Annual Meeting at St.
George's, Grenada (May, 1999), at http://www.cetaceos.com/tratados-iwc-51-
pres.htm.
" See Press Release, High North Alliance, Japan's Whale Fleet Returns to Port,
(Sept. 20,2000), at http://www.highnorth.no/news/nedit.asp?which=255. See also
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Briefing on U.S. Actions
on Japanese Whaling (Sept. 13, 2000), at http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-
e009.html [hereinafter White House Briefing].
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taking diminished the effectiveness of IWC's conservation program
under the Pelly Amendment.35 The criticism of the aboriginal
3 Letter from William Clinton, President of the United States, to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate (Dec. 29, 2000),
at http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-e129.html [hereinafter Pelly Letter from
President Clinton]. The Pelly Amendment amended the Fisherman's Protective
Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
1978(a)(1)(2000). President Clinton, however, declined to sanction Japan,
although the Pelly Amendment grants the President the authority to take such
discretionary action against a country that is diminishing the effectiveness of a
conservation treaty to which the United States is a party. Pelly Letter from
President Clinton, supra; see also 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (a)(4)(2000). In a letter to
Congress, President Clinton wrote, "I do not believe that import prohibitions
would further our objectives at this time." Pelly Letter from President Clinton,
supra. The letter also notes, however, that President Clinton had "personally
intervened with [Japanese] Prime Minister Mori." Id. The President also took
action against Japan under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, whereby
upon certification by the Secretary of Commerce that a foreign country has
diminished the effectiveness of an international fishery program, the United
States may deny that country full access to its coastal waters and reduce the
catch of foreign fishing fleets by not less than fifty percent. Pub. L. No. 96-61, §
3(a), 93 Stat. 407 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994)). See also White
House Briefing, supra note 34. In response to Japan's decision to increase the
number of whale species subject to the research exception, former Secretary of
Commerce Norman Mineta stated in part:
Now, our response must be clear and must be decisive. We have taken
several diplomatic steps and certified Japan under the Pelly
Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. Further, to
my certification, I believe it is imperative that within the next 60 days
we develop options for actions for the President's consideration,
including appropriate economic measures as warranted by
developments in Japan.
Id.
The most critical distinction between the Pelly Amendment and the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is the level of presidential discretion. Whereas
the Pelly Amendment grants the President discretion to authorize trade
sanctions, sanctions under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment are triggered
by the certification of the Secretary of Commerce. "[I]n 1982, Congress passed
supplemental legislation designed to compliment the Pelly Amendment. This
legislation, known as the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, removed the
President's discretion to impose sanctions following a country's certification by
the Secretary of Commerce." David S. Lessoff, Comment, Jonah Swallows the
Whale: An Examination of American and International Failures to Adequately
Protect Whales From Impending Extinction, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 413,418-19
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exception has several bases. One of the more common criticisms
is that, by allowing the aboriginal exception to continue, IWC
is granting "leverage" to Japan and Norway in their respective
quests to receive limited quota allocations for certain coastal
communities to engage in what is termed "small type coastal
whaling (STCW)."3 6 Both Japan and Norway argue that local
(1996) (citation omitted). "Unlike Pelly Amendment sanctions, Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment sanctions did not require the President to impose the
sanctions. They went into effect immediately upon certification by the Secretary
of Commerce." Alma S. Beck, Comment, The Makah's Decision to Reinstate
Whaling: When Conservationists Clash With Native Americans Over an Ancient
Hunting Tradition, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 359, 383 n.146 (1996).
Litigation, however, has tested the effectiveness of the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment. Two lower courts ruled in favor of plaintiffs seeking a
writ to compel then Secretary of Commerce Baldridge to certify Japan under the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment for alleged violations of the 1982 moratorium;
the Supreme Court, however, reversed. Am. Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 604 F.
Supp. 1398, 1404-05 (D.D.C. 1985), affd, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd sub
nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986). The
lower court held that the Secretary's decision was non-discretionary, accepting
the plaintiffs argument that a "side agreement" between the United States and
Japanese governments in 1984 that allowed Japan to circumvent certification
was a violation of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. Am. Cetacean Soc'y,
604 F. Supp. at 1405-07. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, despite
language cited by plaintiffs, the Secretary of Commerce retained discretion
under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to certify a country whose citizens
had failed to observe a quota established by IWC. Japan WhalingAss'n, 478 U.S.
at 231-32. Critics suggest that the Supreme Court's decision has therefore
diminished the effectiveness of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. See, e.g.,
Schiffman, supra note 13, at 319; D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 3, at 52 &
nn.211-12.
The perceived ineffectiveness of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment was
exacerbated in 1988 when the United States removed all fishing quotas allocated
to foreign fleets. See Beck, supra at 383. This action undermined the threat of
certification under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, just as presidential
reluctance to certify nations under the Pelly Amendment diminished the Act's
effectiveness as a tool for international compliance. Id. Recent discussions in the
United States indicate that the country may reinstate foreign quotas in the near
future. See Council Meeting Motions, New England Fishery Management
Council, available at http://www.nefmc.orglactions/index.html (Sept. 26-28
2000). Presumably, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment would exclude Japan
from those reinstated quotas. See 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(D)(ii).
36 Beck, supra note 35, at 394-98.
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communities have engaged in STCW for generations and should be
granted exemptions from the moratorium on historical and
cultural grounds, analogous to those provided to certain other
states on behalf of resident indigenous communities.37 To date,
IWC has refused repeated requests by both Japan and Norway for
STCW quota allocations.38
Perhaps the second most frequent criticism of the aboriginal
exception is that not all of the indigenous communities currently
benefitting from an IWC quota allocation can adequately demon-
strate a sustained dependence on whale hunting and the products
derived therefrom.39 This accusation has been especially caustic in
its application toward the Makah people, an indigenous population
residing on the coast of Washington State in the United States.4 °
The Makah experienced an almost eighty-year interruption in
their whaling tradition, primarily because of the over-exploitation
of the gray whale by the non-native whaling industry in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.4 '
The causes of the eighty-year cessation, however, are less
central to the debate over the aboriginal exception than the
existence of the cessation itself. It is argued that, because of the
" Gregory F. Maggio, Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in Inter-
national Legal Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENvTL. L.
& POLY 179,204 (1997); See also Beck supra note 35, at 394 & nn.217-18. STCW
is generally understood to have a community base (as opposed to a corporate
base), but STCW does have a commercial component-an intent to achieve a
gain beyond subsistence. Id. Japan concedes that STCW is not aboriginal (the
communities in each country engaged in STCW are not indigenous, and do not
possess a culture and society distinct from the larger dominant society). Id. For
an extended discussion of STCW as put forward by Japan, see id. at 394. For a
discussion regarding Norway's perspective on STCW, see Sarah Suhre,
Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the International Whaling Com-
mission's Shift From a Policy of Regulation to One of Preservation, 12 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 305 (1999) For further discussion of what might be labeled "non-
aboriginal" coastal whaling, see Maggio, supra at 203-06.
3 See Leesteffy Jenkins & Cara Romanzo, Makah Whaling: Aboriginal Sub-
sistence or a Stepping Stone to Undermining the Commercial Whaling
Moratorium?, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71, 91-92 (1998).
" Suhre, supra note 37, at 325; Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 38, at 80.40 See, e.g., Jenkins & Romano, supra note 38, at 80.
41 Suhre, supra note 37, at 324.
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interruption in whaling, the Makah cannot meet IWC's standards
to justify granting an aboriginal exemption. One such standard
is a "continuing traditional dependence on whaling and on the use
of whales."4 3 Some critics claim that the Makah's continuing
tradition has not been sustained." This criticism has been
forcefully countered, however, by relying on a history of federal
litigation which appears to defeat the argument that there is a
"statute of limitations" on the practice of aboriginal whaling.45 Part
of this reasoning is that a statute of limitations should be invoked
against those that have allowed their rights to lay dormant,
despite "knowledge and ample opportunity to assert them."46 In
addition, the statute of limitations defense against Indian claims
is incompatible with the "ward" status of Indian tribes.47
II. SPECIES ABUNDANCE
Exceptions to the moratorium to date have been vigorously
contested.48 The moratorium thus remains in place, but certainly
not unscathed. IWC has been strongly challenged for initiating the
moratorium, and additionally for allowing it to remain in place in
the face of "available scientific evidence."49
42 Jenkins & Romanzo, supra note 38, at 78.
Id. (quoting G.P. Donovan, The International Whaling Commission and
Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling: April, 1979 to July, 1981, in INTERNATIONAL
WHALING COMMISSION, ABORIGINALISUBSISTENCE WHALING (WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE ALASKA AND GREENLAND FISHERIES), SPECIAL IsSUE 4, at 79,
83 (1982)).
Beck, supra note 35, at 368-70.
4 5 See id.
46 Id. at 370 (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226
(1985) (citation omitted)).
" Beck supplements the court's discussion, pointing to the principle that Indian
treaty rights may only be abrogated by an act of Congress. Id. at 370, n.72.
"See, e.g., Lawrence Watters & Connie Dugger, The Hunt for Grey Whales: The
Dilemma of Native American Treaty Rights and the International Moratorium
on Whaling, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 319, 335-39 (1997) (presenting arguments
for and against the Makah aboriginal exception and noting vigorous opposition
by the United States to parallel applications by Japan and Norway).
" See Anthony Matera, Note, Whale Quotas: A Market Based Solution to the
Whaling Controversy, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 30-31 (2000).
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It is important to remember that the moratorium is not
permanent, but reviewed annually by IWC. After setting catch
limits for commercial whaling at zero, the resolution's critical
sentence continues by stating that "[t]his provision will be kept
under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990
at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive
assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and
consider modification of this provision and the establishment of
other catch limits."
50
The "comprehensive assessment" referred to in the resolution
is not yet completed. 5' IWC's Scientific Committee defined com-
prehensive assessment as "an in-depth evaluation of all whale
stocks in the light of management objectives and procedures...
that.., would include the examination of current stock size, recent
population trends, carrying capacity and productivity."52 Although
there are numerous questions and debates regarding the best way
to accomplish a comprehensive assessment, not all are presented
in this Article. Certainly, though, one of the major assessment
activities is a revision of the prior management procedure, referred
to as the New Management Procedure ("NMP").53 The NMP had
50 JWC, Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting, supra note 21, at 40.
51 Whale Population Estimates, International Whaling Commission, at http:fl
www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/estimate.htm (last visited Jan. 25,2005) (listing
whale species currently under analysis) [hereinafter Whale Population
Estimates].
52 Id.
5 NMP was IWC's attempt to improve an earlier management procedure which
had been based on a unit of measurement termed the "blue whale unit" ("bwu").
1 BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 120-21. In the 1930s,
[tihe realisation that unlimited catches and over-production would
extend the slump in oil prices to the detriment of all participants now
brought most whaling companies together in 1932 to negotiate a
voluntary limitation of output.
Instead of allocating quotas in terms of oil barrelage, which would not
encourage companies to maximise their yields of oil per whale, each
company was allotted a fixed quota in terms of whales but the
calculation of the quota was based on assumptions concerning the
amount of oil that was obtainable from each species of whale.
Id. at 119-20. The key point is that quotas were not species-specific; states
were allowed to take from the stocks of any species as long as those countries
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failed to maintain certain stocks of whales above an acceptable
level,54 either at a "sustainable," stage (where the population
did not exceed their quotas based on a fixed number of bwus (e.g., five sei whales
equaled one bwu). See id. at 120. This procedure, which preceded ICRW and
IWC by several years, was abandoned in 1974 because it had demonstrably
failed to prevent the continued exploitation of whale species stocks that had
been severely diminished. Id. at 120 & n.50.
NMP, which was adopted over the 1975-76 period, was based on the idea
of "maximum sustainable yield" ("MSY"), which was based on the premise that
taking whales of a particular species should not exceed the ability of that stock
to replenish itself at a rate which will maintain abundance at a commercially
viable level. Report of the Scientific Committee, 42 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N
55-56 (1992); see also NOAA Fisheries Strategic Plan, Glossary, National Marine
Fisheries Service, at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/om2/glossary.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2005). IWC hoped to bring as many species as possible into a category
termed "sustained management stocks," which implied a greater adherence to
principles of conservation. See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 3, at 40. NMP,
however, "required data in excess of what member states were willing to
provide." Ronald B. Mitchell, Forms of Discourse/Norms of Sovereignty: Inter-
ests, Science, and Morality in the Regulation of Whaling, in THE GREENING OF
SOVEREIGNTY IN WORLD POLITICS 141 (Karen T. Litfin ed., 1998).
NMP was species-specific, which, in IWC's view, gave it an advantage over
the previous management procedure. "The New Management Procedure (NMP)
set out to manage each whale population separately. Populations depleted to
below their level of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) were to be protected,
while catches from populations above were limited so as not to deplete them
below this level." J. Baird Callicott, Whaling in Sand County:A Dialectical Hunt
for Land Ethical Answers to Questions About the Morality of Norwegian Minke
Whale Catching, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 1, 3 n.8 (1997) (quoting
Justin Cooke, Introduction and Overview, to DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND WHALES
OF THE WORLD: THE IUCN RED DATA BOOK 10 (Margaret Klinowska ed., 1991)).
Although the species-specific NMP was an improvement over the previous
procedure, it was less than effective at multi-stock assessment within particular
species. See Alexander Gillespie, The Ethical Question in the Whaling Dispute,
9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 355, 357 n.15 (1997). This shortcoming, combined
with the need for sufficient data, led to the discrediting of NMP by the time of
the moratorium's adoption in 1982. Id. The "lack of adequate biological data
... in turn [led] to deficient catch quotas." Id.
51 Utilizing the concept of MSY, the NMP divided whale stocks into three
categories, "protection stocks," "sustained management stocks," and "initial
management stocks."
In theory, if the original stock size could be calculated, it should be
possible to take whales when they are at 50-60% of their original
390
BEST SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE
withstood harvest to replenish itself and retain a certain abun-
dance), or at a minimum, at a level where exploitation did not
threaten the species with extinction.55 Continued decline in
industrial catches and an apparent parallel decline in species
abundance through the 1970s led IWC to determine that the NMP
was inadequate, and eventually motivated the imposition of the
moratorium in 1982.6 In 1994, the Revised Management Proce-
dure ("RMP") replaced the NMP1 7
abundance. This rate of predation should be sustainable over time,
presuming the stocks to be exploited can be brought back to the
acceptable percentage of their original numbers. Stocks that fell 10%
below MSY were to be exempt from exploitation and treated as
protection stocks. Stocks at 10-20% above MSY could be exploited-
but not heavily so that they too could recover-and [be] treated as
sustained management stocks. Stocks more than 20% above MSY
were viewed sufficiently abundant to be taken at a higher rate and
treated as initial management stocks. Unfortunately, the scheme
proved unworkable.
Friedheim, supra note 20, at 356. For the text of the ICRW Schedule that creates
the three stock classifications, see Bums, supra note 28, at 43 n.73. MSY is
"[tihe point of inflection between the left and right hal[ves]" of a "single-species
sustainable yield curve." Burns, supra note 28, at 42 n.71 (citing ELLIOT A.
NORSE, GLOBAL MARINE DIVERSITY 90, 91 (1993)). The yield curve depicts where
the total catch of a species resides on the curve, contingent on the available
species biomass and the effort put into a harvest. Id. As long as a fishing (or,
presumably, a whaling) industry "operates in the left half of the curve,
increasing effort results in a larger catch. But on the right half of the curve,
more fishing effort causes the catch to decrease." Id. (emphasis in original).
" Listing this matter as one of three "management objectives," IWC outlined
that assessment must establish an "acceptable risk that a stock not be depleted
(at a certain level of probability) below some chosen level (e.g. a fraction of its
carrying capacity), so that the risk of extinction of the stock is not seriously
increased by exploitation." Chairman's Report of the Forty-Second Annual
Meeting, 41 REP. INTL WHALING COMM'N 17 (1991) [hereinafter IWC, Forty-
Second Annual Meeting].
5 6 Chairman's Report of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting, 45 REP. INT'L WHALING
COMM'N 15, 26, 43-44 (1995) [hereinafter IWC, Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting].57 Id.
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Simply stated, the RMP is "the specification for the calcula-
tion of catch limits for baleen whales." 8 Its objectives, for example,
are
to provide an acceptable balance between conservation
and exploitation of baleen whales and to provide a simple
and convenient method for determining catch limits with
minimal requirements for data. The procedure seeks to
ensure that depleted stocks are rehabilitated, and that no
whaling is permitted on stocks which are below 54% of
their initial abundance. The aim is to obtain the highest
possible continuing yield, with stable catch limits, to
bring all stocks to the target level of 72% of their initial
level.5 9
The dictum that no catches should be allowed on stocks below fifty-
four percent of the estimated carrying capacity is not new; the
NMP included the same premise.6 ° The goal of returning all stocks
to seventy-two percent of their initial abundance, however, is new
with the RMP, and reflects an increasing concern with conserva-
tion within IWC. 6' In general, the RMP contains three major
components.
The first is the catch limit algorithm ["CLA"I]. This is a
mathematical formula designed to account for all the
variables affecting the stability of whale stock sizes and
for setting a catch limit which would ensure that whale
58See Ray Gambell, The International Whaling Commission Today, in WHALING
IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC - ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gudrun
Petursdottir ed., 1997), available at http://www.highnorth.no/library/publica
tions/iceland/th-in-to.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
59 
Id.60 Id.
1 See AlfHAkon Hoel, Regionalization of International Whale Management: The
Case ofNorth Atlantic Marine Mammals Commission, 46 ARCTIC 116,117 (1993)
(noting the ongoing battle between preservation interests and conservation
interests within IWC).
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populations are not depleted. The second element of the
RMP is on-going population assessment and monitoring.
Finally, a truly effective international inspectorate and
observer scheme is essential to guarantee the success of
the RMP.62
These components are co-dependent; the CLA can not effec-
tively be implemented without an estimation of whale abundance,
which in turn depends on successful execution of the second
component, on-going population monitoring." Because a primary
management objective is to establish stable (and "safe") catch
limits,' IWC adopted the position that these limits must be
statistically "specified" as accurately as possible. 5 The procedure
chosen to make this specification is the CLA,66 which requires
"knowledge of two essential parameters: estimates of current
abundance taken at regular intervals; and knowledge of past and
present catches."67
62 Gillespie, supra note 53, at 357 n.16.
"' "The viability of the CIA relies, inter alia, on accurate abundance calculations
for whale stocks." Burns, supra note 28, at 58.
' IWC, Forty-Second Annual Meeting, supra note 55. The other objectives are
to establish recent population trends, carrying capacity, and productivity. See
Whale Population Estimates, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
65 IWC's Scientific committee engaged in eight years of rigorous testing of five
different statistical procedures before adopting a technique developed by Justin
Cooke-the "C" procedure, a label taken from Mr. Cooke's last name. Friedheim,
supra note 20, at 349 n.82; Report of the Scientific Committee, 41 REP. INT'L
WHALING COMM'N 217 (1991).
66 This procedure was developed "to establish reasonable estimates of whale
population numbers in order to establish whale population boundaries and to
design a management system that would allow sustainable catches of particular
species." Peter Bridgewater & Gordon Anderson, Whales or Whalers?, 24 SEARCH
190 (1993).
67 Whale Population Estimates, supra note 51; see also G. P. Donovan, The
International Whaling Commission and the Revised Management Procedure,
available at http://www.highnorth.no/Library/ManagementRegimes/IWC/th-in-
wh.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Donovan, Revised Management
Procedure].
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A. Estimation Methodology
Species abundance is a critical and much-debated issue. It
remains uncertain whether IWC has gained the ability to acquire
reliable and valid data, as well as whether the data collected is
sufficient to assign catch limits for different species. IWC concedes
the limitations of the CLA.
Very simply, the CLA recogni[z] es that initially the "true"
situation of the stock is poorly known, i.e., that there is a
wide range of possible values for the level of depletion of
the stock and its productivity. Similarly, it recogni[z]es
the two kinds of uncertainty in the estimate of current
population size: that the methodology used to estimate
abundance, although it produces a "best" estimate, can
actually only give a range within which the population
size probably lies; and secondly, that the estimate may be
biased.6"
Even with knowledge of the CLA's limitations, IWC accepted
and endorsed the CLA in 1994.69 IWC believes it had good reason
for accepting the CIA as the resident estimation procedure. "The
CLA is a 'feedback' procedure-as more information accumulates
from sighting surveys (and catches, if taken), then the estimates
of necessary parameters are refined. In this way the procedure
constantly monitors itself."7" The CLA balances "conservation and
exploitation... with minimal requirements for data .... The only
data input required for the revised procedure are a current
population estimate and the known catch history."71 Clearly, the
implication is that the limited need for data is an improvement
68 Whale Population Estimates, supra note 51.
69 IWC, Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting, supra note 56, at 43.
70 Whale Population Estimates, supra note 51. See also Donovan, Revised Man-
agement Procedure, supra note 67. In a notable admission, Donovan states that
"h]ow a single value is chosen is again largely a political decision, balancing the
conservation and exploitation objectives." Id.
71 Gambell, supra note 58.
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over the prior NMP. The data required, however, must be suffi-
cient and of necessary quality in order for the CLA to work as
designed and meet its objectives.
In addition, the Scientific Committee has developed
guidelines and rules for how sighting surveys should be
conducted and how the data are to be analy[z]ed if the
resultant estimates are to be considered to be of suffi-
cient quality to be used in the CLA. Similar guidelines
and rules have been developed with respect to data
requirements, quality, and analysis. In summary, the
culmination of eight years' work by the Scientific Commit-
tee has been the most rigorously tested management
procedure for a natural resource yet developed. It sets a
standard for the management of all marine and other
living resources."
There has been stringent criticism of the methods utilized by
IWC to gather the survey sighting data and catch history data,
which is then entered into the CLA.
Difficulties arise in the design of surveying techniques
and the implementation of survey methodologies ....
Biases often creep into survey designs that render the
data derived from the surveys inherently suspect. For
example, surveying vessels may seek to avoid bad
weather and may concentrate their surveying efforts in
more temperate areas...73
In addition, some critical premises of a popular surveying method
termed "transect surveying" may be unwarranted. 74 The method
"assumes that target animals are stationary prior to detection,
which is critical to defining the conditional probability of detec-
tion, and that all animals directly on the trackline established for
71 Whale Population Estimates, supra note 51.
71 Burns, supra note 28, at 58.
74 See id.
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counting purposes are detected. In reality, neither of these
assumptions is borne out in the real world."75
Insofar as catch histories are concerned, there has been an
apparent justifiable suspicion of significant under-reporting of
industry catches for decades."6 IWC relies heavily upon catch
reports to form the data base for an estimation program like the
CLA." It is now known that the former Soviet Union deliberately
submitted falsified catch statistic data to IWC for years, if not
decades.78 The statistical data provided to IWC "were substantially
" Id. at 59. Concerns about the validity of the data upon which the CLA relies
have been recognized by statisticians and marine biologists for some time; in
1994, scholars produced much work at a conference dedicated to this topic. See,
e.g., Gordon L. Swartzman, Use of the Revised Management Plan for Whale and
Fisheries Management (1994) (paper presented at the SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES AND MARINE MAMMALS, Washington, D.C. (April,
1994)), available at http://www.highnorth.no/Library/Management_ Regimes/
IWC/us-of-th.htm. For a summary of the conference, which was organized by the
Science and Environment Policy Project, see Major Conferences, Science and
Environment Policy Project, at http://www.sepp.org/conferences.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2005). To address these concerns, the National Marine Fisheries
Service ("NMFS"), a unit of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Agency ("NOAA") of the Department of Commerce, formed a peer review panel
to test for an adequate level of "robustness" in the CLA. See Swartzman, supra.
IWC selected the CLA as the RMP's management rule in part because the
NMFS peer review panel detected satisfactory robustness, but also because the
CLA was found to be strongly conservative, or risk-averse, regarding stock
protection. See id. Although the CLA remains dependent on survey data,
conservative stock abundance estimation techniques are meant to mitigate
possible errors in data compilation.
Uncertainty is the keyword for the CIA. The estimate of uncertainty
is used to set catch limits. It does this in an extremely risk-averse
fashion, especially when it comes to stock protection. The CLA uses
the requisite data to revise its range of uncertainty about the
productive potential of the whale stock and the estimation accuracy
(bias) of its abundance estimate.
Id.
76 See, e.g., Burns, supra note 28, at 63.
77 See supra note 67 and aceompanying text.
71 See Gambell, supra note 58 (citing V.A. ZEMSKY, MATERIALS ON WHALING BY
SOVIET WHALING FLEETS (1947-1972) (1995)); Burns, supra note 28, at 63 & nn.
182-86.
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falsified to conceal large scale violations of the international
regulations." 79 For some IWC observers, this new information
should compel IWC to revise the estimates of catch statistics
compiled since the 1950s.
80
As noted above, one of the critical "data inputs" required by
the CLA is the "known" catch history."1 The new Soviet revelations
suggest that the true catch history is unknown. Without a full and
accurate data base to work from, it is unlikely that the CLA will
produce "safe" catch limits for various whale species. It is thus not
clear that what was characterized some years ago as the "data
problem" has been overcome; "[wihat data exists [sic] are question-
able in many aspects, fragmentary, and at best, highly speculative.
Information on the marine ecosystem necessary for any real
understanding of living whales is almost totally lacking."82 Clearly,
at the present time IWC disagrees with this evaluation, at least for
certain whale species.
The question of multi-species interaction, and the resulting
consequences for the ecosystem in which different whale species
may reside, has also been a vigorous topic of debate among
biologists with good reason.
The dynamics of a single baleen whale population are
often modeled using a delay-difference equation .... It is
well known that many species of baleen whale are
competitors for the same food sources. Thus, the minke
whale might compete with the blue or fin whale for
capelin, herring or cod. A complete multispecies model
would involve a system of simultaneous delay-difference
equations, with interaction terms between the various
species. Such a model is presently beyond our ability to
9 Gambell, supra note 58.
80 See Burns, supra note 28, at 63.
81 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
2 Lessoff, supra note 35, at 422 (quoting Dr. L. Talbot, a former Senior Scientist
with the Council for Environmental Quality).
2005] 397
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. [Vol. 29:375
empirically estimate and, from an economic perspective,
to optimize. 3
Some observers have attributed to IWC both the ability to
recognize the problem and a determination to come to grips with
it.
While the IWC has had good information on the more
localized structure and differentiation of feeding and
breeding grounds for some species and areas, there is
little reliable quantitative information for others. The
CLA therefore needed to cover the management of areas
in which more than one population might be present.8 4
IWC believes it has adequately addressed this issue with the
selection of the CLA. "In considering further trials of the CLA, the
Scientific Committee agreed that the CLA was robust to a wide
range of uncertainty, including the question of multi-species effects
and performance in the presence of environmental degradation."8 5
The contention that IWC has indeed diminished the level of
uncertainty regarding multi-species effects to an acceptable level
has not gone unchallenged, however.8 6 The multi-species effect
problem is particularly important because a number of states
seeking to gain an end to the moratorium (or at least an end to
what is termed a "blanket" moratorium), seek to gain catch limits
83 Jon Conrad & Trond Bjorndal, On the Resumption of Commercial Whaling:
The Case of the Minke Whale in the Northeast Atlantic, 46 ARCTIC 164, 165
(1993) (citation omitted).
14 Bridgewater & Anderson, supra note 66, at 190-91. This quote appears to be
referring to different stocks of the same species, but it also refers to the
complexity of estimation increases with an increasing number of individuals
from different stock populations, regardless of whether those stocks are drawn
from one or multiple species.
I5 WC, Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting, supra note 56, at 23 (emphasis added).
Environmental degradation, for example, is seen as particularly ominous for
large mammals such as whales because of their already relatively low levels of
reproduction. Burns, supra note 28, at 64-68 (discussing marine pollution,
depletion of the ozone layer, and climate change). Marine pollution could
threaten several species through an increase in infant mortality, in conjunction
with the aforementioned low fertility rates. Id.
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for specific whale species and even to harvest specific stocks of
particular species.
If commercial whaling were resumed, it would be from
stocks that were abundant and at rates that would pose
little or no risk of extinction. Prime candidates for harvest
were the minke whale in the Atlantic, Pacific and South-
ern oceans (around Antarctica), the sperm whale and the
fin whale off the coast of Iceland. 7
B. Whale Stocks
The preceding argument has received credibility even from
those generally opposed to lifting the moratorium. Regarding IWC
members who continue to support the moratorium, and in some
cases would support a permanent whaling ban, one commentator
states "[it has become apparent that this line of objection has a
limited duration, as the reintroduction of commercial whaling
under the RMP can be scientifically justified. In time, the IWC can
be expected to authorize commercial whaling of [m]inke whales.""8
Indeed, a number of governments believe that there is sufficient
evidence documenting the relative abundance of minke whales to
justify harvesting the species.8 9 There is evidence which appears
to show that the Southern Hemisphere minke whale population
safely exceeds 600,000.90 Indeed, IWC's Scientific Committee has
indicated that the Southern Hemisphere population may exceed
700,000, although this number is currently under revision.9'
Of course, factors other than raw population count determine
whether a particular stock of whales can be harvested without
placing the stock at risk; stock productivity, for example, is also
s Conrad & Bj0rndal, supra note 83, at 164.
88 Gillespie, supra note 53, at 358-59 (emphasis in original).
"9 See id. at 359 & nn.29 & 32.
90 See Robert L. Brownell, Jr. et al., The Plight of the "Forgotten" Whales, 32
OCEANUs 5, 7 (1989).9 1 Chairman's Report of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting, 42 REP. INT'L WHALING
COMM'N 11, 24 (1992) [hereinafter IWC, Forty-Third Annual Meeting].
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critical.92 For the Southern Hemisphere stock of minke whales,
IWC has estimated that as many as 4800 could be taken annually
without producing "adverse effects."93 Utilizing the scientific
exception language of ICRW, Japan currently harvests approxi-
mately 540 minke whales annually,9 4 taking 100 from the western
North Pacific stock95 and the balance from the Southern Hemi-
sphere (in contravention of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary).9 6
Norway's harvest has declined over the last few years, with the
number of minke whales from the Northeast Atlantic stock
totaling 487; this declining trend, however, is always subject to
arrest or even reversal.97
The minke whale has only recently come under substantial
hunting pressure in terms of the overall history of the whaling
industry.98 This partially explains the relative abundance of the
species compared to most others, but this relative abundance has
provided an incentive for certain states critical of the morato-
rium to seek IWC licenses for a limited take of "stocks"99 of minke
92 See Whale Population Estimates, supra note 51.
9 Suhre, supra note 37, at 320.94 Id. at 313.
" See Brief Outline of the Japanese Research Whaling Program in the North
Pacific (JARPN), Institute for Cetacean Research, at http://www.luna.pos.to/
whale/genjarpn.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
96 See Pelly Letter from President Clinton, supra note 35.
" See generally Whales Caught in Norwegian Waters by Norwegians 1939-2000,
High North Alliance, at http://www.highnorth.no/statistik/norwaywhale.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2005) (revealing great variation in Norway's minke catch).
98 The minke whale ... is the smallest of the rorquals, a group that
includes the blue, fin and sei whales. Being the smallest, it was the
last to be intensively harvested by whalers working in the Southern
Ocean in the mid-20th century. The population in the Northern
Hemisphere is generally thought to be separate from the population
in the Southern Hemisphere.
Conrad & Bjorndal, supra note 83, at 165 (citation omitted).
" The precise meaning of the term "stock" is not altogether agreed upon. See
Report of the Scientific Committee, 52 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 12 (2000). It
generally signifies distinct populations of a species that are located in different
geographical areas. See id. IWC sometimes refers to particular examples of
"stock" as "management areas." See Report of the Scientific Committee, 41 REP.
INT'L WHALING COMM'N 55 (1991) for an example of this usage. The different
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whales.' Beyond this belief, there is also some sentiment that
other species have now sufficiently "recovered" so that allowing
limited exploitation would not pose an unacceptable threat.'0
There is now considerable scientific evidence to suggest
that several species of baleen whale and possibly the
sperm whale have recovered to levels that would support
commercial harvest. The stock of fin whales off the coast
of Iceland, the minke whale in the Northeast Atlantic,
and the minke whale in the Southern Ocean are prime
candidates for commercial harvest. Japan, Iceland and
Norway have an economic interest in the resumption of
commercial whaling, which they believe can be done
without risking stock extinction or incurring the economic
inefficiencies of open access. 102
There is little question, however, that the minke whale has
been the species receiving the bulk of the attention from states
aspiring to have the moratorium lifted or modified. Some morato-
rium critics believe that if steadily improving data "indicate that
the population of certain species of whales has sufficiently
recovered, the states concerned could consider a motion to repeal
the moratorium."0 3 While the current minke abundance contrib-
utes to this sentiment, it is not the sole motivating factor.
stocks may be distinguished by a number of attributes including, for example,
size and migration patterns. Id. More narrowly, different stocks can be
distinguished by the "dispersal rates between 'stocks,' where 'dispersal' refers
to gene flow [which] is modelled as permanent transfer [of genes] from one
breeding population to another." Id.
100 See Report of the Scientific Committee, 52 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 12
(2000).
101 Japan has expanded its Japanese Research Whaling Program in the North
Pacific ("JARPN II") program to include the taking of fifty Bryde's whales, ten
sperm whales, and fifty sei whales. The function of JARPN II is to gain infor-
mation on species health and abundance. Chairman's Report of the Fifty-Third
Annual Meeting, 52 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 40 (2002).
102 Conrad & Bjorndal, supra note 83, at 170 (citations omitted).
103 Schiffman, supra note 13, at 329.
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People living in Norway have killed minke whales for
centuries. Other species occasionally frequent coastal
waters in the northern summer, but the minke whale is
so often seen close to shore and up the long fjords that in
Norwegian it is called the vgehval-the whale of the
fjord. Thus, long before Norwegian peoples learned to
build even the most primitive boats, they could have
opportunistically speared or trapped and drowned a
minke whale that had strayed too far up a narrow inlet.
After the Vikings learned to build seaworthy boats,
minke whales were regularly hunted as part of the coastal
subsistence regime in Norway. In short, minke whales
are locally available and killing them is a historic local
tradition.104
In 1990, Norway proposed that the Northeastern Atlantic
stock of minke whales be reclassified as a Sustained Management
Stock instead of its previous classification under the old NMP
regime as a Protection Stock.' ° The belief was that "[a] great deal
of research had been carried out and there was now a level of
certainty higher than ever before regarding this stock."0 6 Other
IWC member states had (and continue to have) reservations,
however, including the United Kingdom, which held that there
was still such scientific uncertainty that the present Protection
Stock0 7 classification should not be changed.' At the conclusion
of the 1992 IWC meeting, citing evidence provided by the Scien-
tific Committee, Norway announced its intention to resume
commercial whaling of the minke whales. 10 9 Norway reiterated its
104 Callicott, supra note 53, at 3 (citations omitted).
... IWC, Forty-Second Annual Meeting, supra note 55, at 24-28.
106 Id.
107 This classification did then (and continues to) prohibit any hunting of a stock
so categorized. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
three categories into which the NMP divided all whale stocks.10 IWC, Forty-Second Annual Meeting, supra note 55, at 24-26.
'o'See IWC, Forty-Third Annual Meeting, supra note 91, at 26. See also Editor-
ial, A Misguided Policy on Whaling, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 1993, at 12N (discussing
Norway's decision to set its own rules regarding commercial whaling).
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intention at the conclusion of the 1993 meeting, 110 and has now
been harvesting minke whales from the Northeastern Atlantic
stock since 1993.111
Japan continues to harvest 100 minke whales annually from
the northwestern North Pacific stock, despite contrary beliefs and
serious reservations about the exploitation of whales generally.
The complexities of whale biology and stocks and the lack
of information related to population dynamics and
behavior are at least partly responsible for the view that
commercial whaling should not exist. The absence of
information about the status of stocks means that it
would be unwise to authorize harvests that might have
irreversible impact." 2
Although Japan continues to cite scientific research as the
motivation for the harvest in the North Pacific, there is much
criticism directed toward this activity from both IWC and other
sources."' Part of the criticism is based on a suspicion that the
harvest of minke whales for research purposes in the North Pacific,
as well as in the Southern Hemispheric Ocean, is only a subter-
fuge; the real purpose of the minke whale hunts is at least partly
believed to be for commercial gain."4
The Japanese response to the criticism directed at its research
program in the Southern Ocean was aptly presented over a decade
ago, 115 and has not been appreciably modified over the intervening
110 David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North
Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in
Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 162 (1995).
1 Suhre, supra note 37, at 314.
112 Watters & Dugger, supra note 48, at 344.
113 See, e.g., Pelly Letter from President Clinton, supra note 35.
114 For example, one observer of the Japanese whaling practices commented that
"[t]oday, many Japanese concede that the current whaling industry is
maintained not for the necessity of the meat to the Japanese diet, but rather for
the profit which can be made from the selling of whale meat to wealthy
restauranteurs in Tokyo for preparation for their upscale clientele." Lessoff,
supra note 35, at 416.
115 See Kazuo Sumi, The Whale War Between Japan and the United States:
Problems and Prospects, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POLy 317 (1989).
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years. Arguments proposing a modification of the moratorium
most often concern minke whales, whose relative abundance is
of such magnitude that the species could be hunted sustainably.
116
Their present abundance could be maintained even with a limi-
ted hunt, and a limited hunt would not threaten extinction.117 The
argument presented suggests that the Japanese violation of the
moratorium should not be considered egregious because it is
executed for research rather than commercial purposes. For
example, one explicit objective of Japan's whale harvest is to
gather "estimates of various biological parameters, especially of
age-specific natural mortality.""'
In sum, the argument casts the Japanese whaling activity as
an attempt to "provide a scientific basis for resolving problems
facing the IWC which have generated confrontation among the
member nations due to the divergent views on the moratorium."" 9
Opinions regarding the moratorium have continued to diverge
since the argument was presented, yet IWC has routinely con-
demned Japanese whaling conducted under the scientific research
exemption since its inception. 2 ° These condemnations, however,
have not restrained the Japanese whaling activity; rather, Japan
has extended its research to species other than the minke whale
in the North Pacific.' 2'
116 See id. at 327.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 338.
'
19 Id. at 339.
120 With particular regard to both the possible revision of the 1990 estimates of
minke whales in the Southern Ocean, and the Commission's belief that the
Japanese Research Whaling Program in the North Pacific ("JARPN") failed to
address critical research needs, at its 2000 meeting, IWC issued resolutions
"calling on the Government of Japan to refrain from issuing [permits for
research in the Southern Ocean and North Pacific] and reiterated that in
reviewing scientific permits, the Scientific Committee should examine whether
the research is required for management or could be carried out using non-lethal
means." See Final Press Release, International Whaling Commission, 2000
Annual Meeting (July 6, 2000), at http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/meeting
2000.htm (outlining Resolutions 2000-4 and 2000-5, respectively) [hereinafter
IWC Final Press Release].
121 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (noting that a Japanese fleet
took forty-three Bryde's and five sperm whales, in addition to forty minke
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III. UNCERTAINTY
It is important to note that, just as the CLA is a key com-
ponent of the RMP, the latter is a major element of the Revised
Management Scheme ("RMS").' 22 IWC established an RMS
Working Group in 1994, to achieve three objectives: "1) an effective
inspection and observation scheme; 2) arrangements to ensure that
total catches over time are within the limits set under the Revised
Management Scheme; 3) incorporation into the Schedule of the
specification of the Revised Management Procedure and all other
elements of the Revised Management Scheme."12 Although all
three RMS components are important, it would be difficult to
whales, on a research expedition in the North Pacific during the summer of
2000).
122 The RMS is an effort to incorporate both science and politics into the
management of whales. IWC describes that
[aifter the moratorium decision was taken, the IWC Scientific
Committee embarked on a major review of the status of whale stocks
(including an examination of current stock size, recent population
trends and productivity) which it called the Comprehensive
Assessment. At the outset of its work on this, the Scientific
Committee recognised the need to develop management objectives
and procedures that learnt from its previous difficulties, and in
particular recognised the limitations of both the data it had and the
data it was likely to obtain. It spent over eight years developing the
Revised Management Procedure, a scientifically robust method of
setting safe catch limits for certain stocks (groups of whales of the
same species living in a particular area) where the numbers are
plentiful. Given this scientific advance which has been accepted by
the Commission, there has been pressure from some countries to
remove the moratorium for certain stocks of minke whales. However,
before the RMP is implemented and the moratorium on commercial
whaling lifted, the IWC has agreed that an inspection and
observation scheme must be in place to ensure that agreed catch
limits are not exceeded. It is this combination of scientific and non-
scientific factors that comprises the Revised Management Scheme.
Revised Management Scheme, International Whaling Commission, at http://
www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/rms.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2004) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter IWC, Revised Management Scheme].
123 Id.
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overestimate the significance IWC has attached to the observation
and inspection of any future commercial whaling.
Although the scientific component of any all-embracing
revised management scheme has been completed, the
Commission has resolved that until all aspects of the
Revised Management Scheme, including an effective
inspection and observation scheme which fully addresses
inter alia the issues of under-reporting and mis-reporting
of catches, are incorporated into the Schedule the Revised
Management Procedure should not be implemented.'2 4
A. The RMP
The present debate over the adoption of an RMS, including
the political consequences involved, is based on both the disagree-
ment over the science relied upon to formulate the RMP and the
fact that the historical record counsels caution in implementing
a whaling management scheme before adequate verification pro-
tocols are in place.
12 5
The Scientific Committee has unanimously recommended
the RMP to the Commission, noting that all the scientific
aspects of the work had been completed. These scientific
aspects were adopted by the Commission in 1994. Its
actual implementation in whale management (at least for
those stocks for which it has been tested), is of course a
political decision. The Commission will not set catch
limits for commercial whaling until it has agreed and
adopted a complete Revised Management Scheme (RMS).
Any RMS will not only include the scientific aspects such
as the RMP, but a number of non-scientific issues,
including inspection and enforcement, perhaps to hu-
maneness of killing techniques.'26
124 Gambell, supra note 58.
125 See Burns, supra note 28, at 62-63 & n.182.
12 Revised Management Procedure, International Whaling Commission, at http:l
www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/rmp.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
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The last sentence of the preceding quotation makes clear that both
political and ethical questions are among the "non-scientific" issues
which must be adequately addressed before catch limits for certain
whale species will be set. If this is so, decisions governing commer-
cial catch limits should be based, in part, on value choices.
Although the quotation initially suggests that much of the
scientific uncertainty regarding catch limits has been resolved,
there is reason to retain a measure of doubt regarding this matter
"[wihere scientific uncertainty is present, '[dlifferent pressure
groups, with different interests [and values], will disagree on
the degree of risk which is "acceptable.""' 2 7 An IWC discussion
pertaining to g(O), the probability of sighting a whale on the
trackline 12 may illustrate why one should remain skeptical
regarding whether uncertainty has been reduced to acceptable
levels.'2 9 If all animals on the trackline are actually seen, then
g(O)=1.0.3 ° Because it is not likely that all whales navigating the
trackline will be sighted, the probability of sighting a whale on the
trackline is actually less than one (i.e., g(O)= <1).' Therefore, g(O)
12 7 John M. Macdonald, Appreciating the Precautionary Principle as an Ethical
Evolution in Ocean Management, 26 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 255, 257 (1995)
(citing S. Garcia, The Precautionary Principle: Its Implication in Capture
Fisheries Management, 22 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 99, 119 (1994)).
128 Tracklines refer to lines of known whale movement which transect a chosen
ocean area. See Report of the Scientific Committee, 40 REP. INT'L WHALING
COMM'N 54-55 (1990).
129 Burns describes transect surveying, which is probably the most frequently
employed method to gain whale abundance estimates. Burns, supra note 28, at
59. It "assumes that target animals are stationary prior to detection, which is
critical to defining the conditional probability of detection, and that all animals
directly on the trackline established for counting purposes are detected." Id.
Burns also notes that "[tihe line-transect surveying method applies statistical
methods to census data collected along lines transecting in a given area of the
ocean." Id. at 59 n.57 (citing Douglas G. Chapman, Living Resources: Whales, 31
OCEANUS 64, 67 (1998)). Burns goes on to quote Zahl, who states that "[t]he
effect of animal movement is to distort the detection probability function." Id. at
59 (quoting S. Zahl, Line Transect Sampling with Unknown Probability of
Detection Along the Transect, 45 BIOMETRICS 453, 469 (1989)).
130 See IWC, Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting, supra note 56, at 23. This discussion
is found in the Chairman's "summary" of the Report of the Scientific Committee.
131 See id.
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must be estimated based on the accuracy of the survey. As
accuracy increases, g(O) approaches one. 32
During the 1994 IWC meeting, the Scientific Committee held
a discussion on the estimation of g(O). 133 The discussion focused
on the-variations of the estimation in different years for the same
stock of whales: Northeastern Atlantic minke."' An estimate
from 1992 set g(O)=0.36, while a new estimate for 1994 found
g(O)=0.587. 35 This discrepancy was cause for considerable concern
within both the Scientific and Technical Committees.
In the Technical Committee, the Netherlands asked
whether this problem would have an effect on the existing
estimates of North Atlantic and Southern Hemisphere
minke whales. In response the Chairman of the Scientific
Committee clarified that in the case of North Atlantic
minke whales this may indeed have consequences for the
estimate. Ifg(O) is re-estimated for Southern Hemisphere
and North Pacific minke whales, where at present it is
assumed that g(O)=1, then, the estimated g(O) shall be <1.
Upon a question from Norway the Chairman of the
Scientific Committee pointed out that no new estimates
of abundance had been suggested in the Scientific Com-
mittee for the northeastern Atlantic minke whale stock.
The USA emphasized the importance of the g(O) issue.
The Scientific Committee also commented on its recogni-
tion of the problems of investigation avoidance or attrac-
tion behaviour which could bias shipboard line transect
estimates for North Atlantic minke whales. 136
The "counting" methodology issue is extremely important in
establishing catch limits. Before catch limits can be set for a par-
ticular species, the species' relative and (theoretically) absolute
abundance must be known. However, abundance can only be
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 Id.
136 IWC, Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting, supra note 56, at 23.
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calculated through the application of sampling techniques because
not all whales in a particular population can actually be observed.
The accuracy of sampling techniques, in turn, depends upon valid
and reliable counting. The estimation of g(O) is a way of gaining
some confidence in the validity and reliability of the counting
methodologies utilized. The higher the estimate of g(O), the lower
the abundance estimate will be; conversely, the lower the g(O)
estimate, the higher the estimate of abundance. This is the case
because g(O) is applied to a fixed figure, a "count," drawn from the
transect survey. The g(O) estimate allows the researcher to
calculate the approximate total number of specimens in a stock
based on the proportion of that number the researcher believes is
formed by the fixed count.'37
The Scientific Committee discussion from the 1994 meeting
illustrates how concerns regarding stock abundance, and conse-
quently any future catch limits, have developed from different
member states. These concerns pertain to scientific uncertainty,
and therefore are addressed by the RMS's second objective: "to
ensure that total catches over time are within the limits set under
the RMS."' Accordingly, the discussion is worth reproducing.
In the Plenary, there was extensive questioning of the
Chairman of the Scientific Committee by the Commission-
ers on the details of the g(O) issue and its implications for
the assessment of the northeast Atlantic minke whale
stock. Ireland sought clarification of the Report of the
Scientific Committee, while the Netherlands refuted the
claim by Norway that the estimate [g(O)=.36] made at
the Glasgow meeting in 1992 is still valid, believing that
the questions over g(O) mean that there is no generally
accepted abundance estimate. The UK associated itself
with these remarks. Germany noted that a special
working group will address the problem and received
confirmation that until the Scientific Committee has
"'See Report of the Scientific Committee, 41 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 51,58,
65 (1991).
138 IWC, Revised Management Scheme, supra note 122.
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resolved the issue, the exact status of the stock is not
known. Spain also noted the uncertainty involved. Iceland
received confirmation that if the alternative value ofg(O)
[g(O)=0.5871 is correct, the estimate of numbers would be
dramatically reduced.
Norway expressed surprise at these questions, pointing to
the statements that the Scientific Committee had no
business to discuss on this stock and no new estimate of
abundance had been suggested. The Chairman of the
Scientific Committee reiterated that there is an estimate
of g(O) from two years ago, and a new analysis and new
estimate this year. It was not possible to resolve the cause
of the difference this year and it was not deemed appro-
priate to take the next step to make a new estimate of
abundance while there is uncertainty over the value of
g(O) to use. The Netherlands repeated its intervention,
concluding that the most important issue was the conse-
quential effect on the abundance estimate, which could
result in very different catch limits if the RMP is applied,
possibly even zero if the revised estimate ofg(O) is nearer
the new value calculated. Norway maintained that the
original abundance estimate has not been challenged in
the Scientific Committee and still stands until a different
result is produced, but Ireland understood that additional
data and analysis now indicates uncertainty aboutg(O).39
If we are to accept recent IWC and Scientific Committee
statements, "noting that all the scientific aspects of the [RMPI had
been completed,"4 ° the uncertainty attached to the estimation of
g(O) has presumably been reduced to an acceptable level, thus
enabling the Commission to accept the "scientific aspects" of the
RMP.'4 Contrary opinion suggests that uncertainty has not been
reduced to an acceptable level and it would be erroneous for IWC
to implement the RMS with its dependence on an RMP containing
139 IWC, Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting, supra note 56, at 23-24.
140 IWC, Revised Management Scheme, supra note 122.
141 See id.
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"questionable scientific tenets."42 Uncertainty derived from con-
tested scientific premises, methods, and conclusions, however, has
never alone delayed the implementation of an RMP.
IV. PRECAUTIONS
At the conclusion of its fifty-second annual meeting in
Adelaide, IWC commented on the current status of the RMS.
Although the Commission has accepted and endorsed the
Revised Management Procedure (RMP) for commercial
whaling, it has noted that work on a number of issues,
including, specification of an inspection and observer
system must be completed before the Commission will
consider establishing catch limits other than zero. This
work is ongoing. The Commission passed a Resolution by
consensus with some reservations, to further this work
which will include the holding of an intersessional
Working Group meeting in February 2001.143
At the Inter-sessional Meeting, the discussion focused
on the development of an effective inspection and observa-
tion scheme. Among the issues still to be resolved [were]:
1) the level of international observer coverage required;
(2) the type and level of tracking of whaling vessels
required; (3) the timing (e.g. daily, weekly) of reporting
of whales hunted, struck and killed; (4) maintenance and
availability of a register of DNA profiles of all whales
killed; (5) procedures to monitor the origins of whale
products on the market; and (6) the funding of the
scheme.'"
142 Bums, supra note 28, at 54.
143 IWC Final Press Release, supra note 120.
144IWC, Revised Managment Scheme, supra note 118.
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IWC first, instituted an International Observer Scheme in
1972,'14 and by 1974, there was evidence that the Scheme had
made some headway in improving the data provided by member
states. 146 The .1972 Scheme was a bilateral mechanism in which
two member states voluntarily agreed to exchange observers.'47 In
this Scheme, the observers of one state performed duties on the
ships ofa second country, and the latter state's observers recipro-
cated that duty on the ships of the first country." Today, however,
well-documented evidence exists which shows that the 1972
Scheme failed to uncover quite serious under-reporting of catches
by member states. Norwegian scientists now report that, since
1977, the Norwegian whaling industry deliberately under-reported
its catch of North Atlantic minke whales and thus subverted
proper assessment of the stock by IWC's Scientific Committee. 149
A. Inspection and Observation
Such lamentable reporting has been attributed directly to the
inadequacies of the 1972 Scheme. "Because the inspector is from
the same nation that he is policing, inspection is often lackadaisi-
cal." 5 ° Although IWC believes the scientific component of the RMS
has been completed satisfactorily, these shortcomings have led
IWC to hold that "until all aspects of the Revised Management
Scheme, including an effective inspection and observation scheme
which fully addresses inter alia the issues of under-reporting and
mis-reporting of catches, are incorporated into the Schedule the
141 Valeria N. Spencer, Comment, Domestic Enforcement of International Law:
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POLY 109, 115 n.30 (1991).
146 "The sub-committee pointed out that the introduction of the Observer scheme
had immensely increased the accuracy of the reporting of the more minor
infractions which tended to be ignored to some extent in the past." Chairman's
Report of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting, 26 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 29
(1976).
147 Spencer, supra note 145, at 115.
148 Id.
149 Burns, supra note 28, at 62.
150 Spencer, supra note 145, at 115.
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Revised Management Procedure should not be implemented."15'
This is an example of IWC sounding a cautionary note.
The present impasse in the IWC has arisen because the
majority of the IWC members consider that, in light of the
devastating history of overexploitation by vessels whose
activities were supervised only by national inspectors,
international inspection is indispensable if whaling is
ever to be resumed. The IWC has therefore decided that
the Revised Management Procedure now agreed to in
principle, under which whaling could be resumed on
stocks deemed to have recovered, should not be made
operational until a Revised Management Scheme, estab-
lishing international supervision and control and humane
killing methods, has been instituted.'52
One may infer that IWC is relying on a particular rendering
of the precautionary principle when it continues to postpone the
operation of the RMP. This interpretation of the principle could
be understood to say "until we can know with a high degree of
certainty, that the whaling activity of member states (or more
accurately, the behavior engaged in by certain nationals of
member states) will not exceed express limits on their whaling
activity, we should forego making the RMP operational (within
the context of an RMS)." IWC's language in deferring the activa-
tion of an RMP seems to shift the burden of proof, suggesting
151 Gambell, supra note 58; see generally IWC, Revised Management Scheme,
supra note 122 (outlining progress on the observer issue since 1994).
152 Patricia Birnie, The International Politics of Whaling, by Peter J. Stoett, 51
ARCTIC 67, 68 (1998) (book review). There have been at least two proposals
put forward as a means of providing a remedy to current problems with the
inspection and observation function, a function and responsibility outlined in
Article IV of ICRW. See ICRW, supra note 5, art. IV (1)(a), 62 Stat. at 1718, 161
U.N.T.S. at 78. The first proposal suggests that IWC form a cadre of
"independent" inspectors, free of any national affiliation, with the presumption
being that "IWC observers" would perform more vigorously than national
inspectors. See Watters & Dugger, supra note 48, at 350 & n.173. A second
proposal is for IWC to assign observers from non-whaling states to the vessels
of whaling states, thereby reducing further possible conflicts of interest on the
part of observers. See Spencer, supra note 145, at 116.
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that the precautionary principle may be operating in regard to
inspection and operation.'53
Proof enters the formulation because inspection and obser-
vation must do more than reduce the likelihood of catch limit
violations by IWC members; instead, IWC seems to suggest that
inspection and observation must provide some confidence that
such violations will either not occur or, alternatively, that they
will be discovered and terminated. By allowing either "national
inspectors" or "international observers" to board their ships, the
crews of whaling vessels would be agreeing to the provision of
"proof' that their vessels were not violating any future commer-
cial whaling regime the Commission might establish.' The
153 Michele Territo, The Precautionary Principle in Marine Fisheries Conser-
vation and the U.S. Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996,24 VT. L. REV. 1351, 1355
(2000). Although Territo observes that a shifting of the burden of proof is a
key element of certain formulations of the precautionary principle, other
commentators have noted that other expressions of the principle do not include
this "shift." "The most permissive formulation of the precautionary principle
would require a high level and significant evidence of harm, a limited response
(cost-effective), and would not reverse the burden of proof." Russell Unger,
Brandishing the Precautionary Principle Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 638, 682 (2001). A call for a complete shift of the burden of
proof is generally associated with more stringent versions of the principle. Id.
See also Sonia Boutillon, Note, The Precautionary Principle: Development of an
International Standard, 23, MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 450-51 (2002).
"' The Commission's earlier International Observer Scheme, which was "bila-
teral" in character, did not provide adequate proof, mostly because only major
whaling states were willing to shoulder the costs of supporting, observers placed
on other whaling states' vessels. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
States with an emphasis on whaling in certain geographic locations tended to
devise exchanges of observers on each other's vessels, such as Japan and the
Soviet Union in the Antarctic, although the Commission did make the formal
appointment of observers. See Spencer, supra note 145, at 115 & n.31. "In
practice the issue of observers was dealt with bilaterally, although the letter of
appointment was sent by the Secretary and the original of the report was
received by the Commission. Review of the Observer's reports was undertaken
by the infractions sub-committee." Report of the Revised Management Scheme
Expert Drafting Group, 53 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N App. IV, 15 (2002)
[hereinafter RMS Drafting Group Report]. This earlier International Observer
Scheme operated only until the end of Antarctic commercial whaling in 1986
and 1987, when the moratorium went into effect.
414
BEST SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE
inspection and observation scheme currently under consideration
by IWC designates two categories of scrutiny of whaling vessels.
"National inspectors shall be appointed and paid by the Contract-
ing Government having jurisdiction over the commercial whaling
operations to be inspected and shall receive instructions from
their national authorities."55 In practical terms, the presence of
only national inspectors aboard vessels is severely circumscribed.
The proposed inspection and observation scheme requires the
presence of both a national inspector and an international
observer aboard vessels large enough to accommodate two indi-
viduals in addition to the crew.'56 A national inspector may only
serve aboard a vessel, alone under conditions when it is necessary
for one individual to serve in the capacity of both a national
inspector and an international observer. 157 In addition, the
inspector must "meet the selection requirements for both posi-
tions." 158
The Commission's Secretariat begins the observer selection
process by creating a list of "suitable" candidates. 1 9 The list is
then circulated to all Contracting Governments, which may veto
any candidate. 6 ° After consultation with relevant Contracting
Governments, the Secretariat will decide on the placement of
observers.' 6 ' Observers have no authority to enforce ICRW
provisions; their duties include monitoring whaling operations to
verify adherence to Convention provisions, checking licenses,
logbooks, and equipment, and verifying that certain information
'
5 5 RMS Drafting Group Report, supra note 154, at 5.
156 Id. at 20.
157 Vessels which are <24m, operate only within waters under the
jurisdiction of the Flag state and that can only accommodate one
additional person in addition to the crew. For these vessels the
[expert drafting group] agreed that it would be possible in principle
for an individual to act as both an international observer and a
national inspector.
Id. at 5.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 31.
1 60 Id.
61 RMS Drafting Group Report, supra note 154, at 31.
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on whaling operations is collected and maintained. 162 Most
critically,
(a) an individual shall not be appointed to observe in the
territory or on a vessel flying the flag of the state which
he/she is a national or permanent resident; except if this
results in a serious problem with (b) the fact that an
observer must be able to communicate effectively with
the senior personnel of that component of the whaling
operations they have been selected to observe. 63
The overarching objectives of any imposed inspection and observa-
tion scheme are to
(1) ensure that the rules and regulations of the Commis-
sion are obeyed; (2) ensure that the rules and regulations
of the Commission are seen to be obeyed; (3) report to the
Contracting Government any infractions of those rules
and regulations; (4) report to the commission any infrac-
tions of those rules and regulations.."
It is important to note that taking steps to provide supervision
and control is not simply "protective" action, which occurs if there
is certainty regarding the harm that would occur in the absence of
preventive action. The occurrence of catch limit violations by
contracting governments is not at all certain. Past experience
suggests that there is a level of risk of such violations, however the
degree of the risk is uncertain. Precautionary steps are therefore
necessary.
B. Burden of Proof
Currently there are at least two extant "versions" or interpre-
tations of the precautionary principle that are distinguishable by
162 Id. at 32.
16 3 Id. at 32.
1 4Id. at 4.
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the level of "proof" required that harm will not occur and by the
quality of the "evidence" showing that steps have been taken to
reduce the likelihood of harm.165 The more "stringent" variant of
the principle has been stated as follows.
At one end of the spectrum, many believe that the impor-
tance of the precautionary principle is that it serves to
shift the burden of proof in a proposal that invariably will
affect the marine ecosystem. This theory requires that
any party wishing to place pollutants in the oceans or
pursue particular fishing methods must prove that the
proposed action will not degrade or negatively impact the
environment or resource. 166
In the regulatory field, it has been held that the principle compels
policymakers to anticipate possible harm resulting from certain
decisions. "[TIhe principle asserts that regulators and decision
makers should act in anticipation of environmental harm, without
regard to the certainty of the scientific information pertaining to
the risk of harm."16 7 This idea is consistent with the second, "more
ambiguous" variant of the principle, which
centers on its potential to act as a regulatory forcing
mechanism. This theory would "require States to take
measures to prevent harm and to reduce and control
pollution, instead of simply paying compensation for the
damage that it causes." This interpretation would not so
much require a shifting of the burden of proof, but rather
a commitment by nations to pursue stronger and more
environmentally friendly technologies or management
regimes when engaged in activities that have the poten-
tial to harm the marine environment.'8
165 Macdonald, supra note 127, at 263.
166 Id.
167 Gregory D. Fullem, Comment, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental
Protection in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLIAMEWTE L. REV. 495,
497-98 (1995).
168 Macdonald, supra note 127, at 263 (internal citations omitted).
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IWC's insistence that the RMP cannot be implemented until
an RMS incorporating international inspection and control has
been instituted incorporates a shift in the burden of proof. When
this occurs, parties opposed to a proposed action are no longer
required to gather evidence supporting their belief that the
proposed action will be harmful to the environment.'69 Rather, it
169It has been widely recognized that a shift in the burden of proof (an obligation
on the part of the party proposing an action to show there will be no harm, or
there is a very low likelihood of harm) has been integrated into many for-
mulations of the precautionary principle found in international instruments. "In
effect [the principle] places the burden of proof on those wishing to proceed with
an action to prove lack of environmental harm before proceeding." David Favre,
Debate Within the CITES Community: What Direction for the Future?, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 875, 894 (1993).
The prevention of environmental harm is central to the precautionary
principle generally, and to its burden-shifting aspect in particular. Franqois
Evald makes reference to the 1987 Brundtland Report (OUR COMMON FUTURE:
THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1987)), a
precursor to the precautionary principle (Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Summit),
as designating the importance of "preventing serious or irreversible deter-
iorations of the environment." Franqois Evald, The Return of the Crafty Genius:
An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 47, 59 (1999/2000).
In discussing the incorporation of the principle in the Cartagena Protocol,
for example, one commentator offers the following analysis.
In fact, it is article 15 on risk assessment, that indicates the real role
of the principle in the Protocol. Article 15 implements a framework
where it is up to the export candidate to provide information on the
products, and if required, to proceed to the risk evaluation. In other
words, the burden of proof as to the safety of the product rests upon
the exporter; implicitly, GMOs are considered prima facie as unsafe
products .... The foremost feature [of the principle's application] is
the reversal of the burden of proof, which essentially leaves it to those
who are the best informed to prove the harmlessness of their
products.
Boutillon, supra note 153, at 438-39. Relevant language in the Protocol
regarding scientific uncertainty states that
[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential
adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking
also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party
418
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is "those who propose a new undertaking; they must demonstrate
that the project is environmentally safe and will not cause
harm."7 ° IWC has both embedded such a shift in the scientific
realm, and incorporated it into its new role as an institutional
guarantor of the political and economic behavior of states. 7 '
It is widely understood that the precautionary principle was
established to protect the environment in the face of scientific
uncertainty.'72 An analysis of the inspection and observation
implementation issue based on the precautionary principle may
not be sufficient because the uncertainty in this instance is cen-
tered on human ethical behavior.'73 In addition, the central focus
from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of
the living modified organism in question as referred to in paragraph
3 above, in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, art.
10, 6, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027, 1031 [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety].
There has been a particular emphasis on the part of many observers that
the environment must not be allowed to suffer untoward adverse effects as a
consequence of human activity before preventive action is taken. See Brian
Wynne & Sue Mayer, How Science Fails the Environment, NEW SCIENTIST, June
5, 1993, at 33-34. To lessen the likelihood of this negative and perhaps
unnecessary outcome, "[tihe burden ofproof [must be] shifted from those seeking
to protect the environment to the polluter." Id. See also, Phillipe Sands, The
"Greening" of International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules, 1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 301 (1994).
170 Territo, supra note 153, at 1356.
171 This is what the IWC seems to be referencing when it concedes that an RMS
must necessarily incorporate "non-scientific" issues. See supra note 126 and
accompanying text.
172 See generally David Freestone, The Precautionary Principle, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 21, 21-29 (Robin Churchill &
David Freestone eds., 1991) (discussing the principle in the context of scientific
uncertainty). There may be as many as seven different formulations of the
precautionary principle, being derived in part from its application in different
circumstances in different societies. See JONAS EBBESSON, COMPATIBILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 119 (1996) (citation
omitted).
173 This would appear to be the case if one regards .the conscious mis-
representation to IWC by the Norwegian whaling industry of whale catches as
dishonest and unethical. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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of the precautionary principle is the risk evaluation of proposed
activities, which affect environmental quality, particularly when
a potentially negative substance is introduced into the environ-
ment, or natural resource conservation. "[T]he precautionary
principle ensures that a substance or activity posing a threat to the
environment is prevented from adversely affecting the environ-
ment, even if there is no conclusive scientific proof linking that
particular substance or activity to environmental damage." 74
Because IWC is unsure whether member states will effectively
scrutinize their own whaling activity, it is essentially erring on the
side of caution when considering establishing catch limits. In the
absence of certainty that member states will abide by those limits,
some commentators believe that the risk of harm to whale stocks
is too great, even though nationals of certain states wishing to
whale will admittedly suffer negative consequences.
175
This risk is not directly associated with scientific uncertainty;
it is a risk associated with the values of states and their
nationals.'76 However, it is an assessment of risk, nonetheless,
and therefore may signify that the precautionary principle is at
work regarding the inspection and observation scheme issue.
[I]t is immediately evident that the precautionary prin-
ciple does not seem to have a universal meaning: its
field of jurisdiction is limited in principle to the area of
the environment. But, make no mistake, to the extent
that this involves a principle aiming to impose a certain
type of decision-making in a situation of uncertainty, its
validity will not prevent it being exported outside its
original territory.17
7
174 James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A
Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global
Environment, 14 B.C. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991) [hereinafter Cameron &
Abouchar, Fundamental Principle].
7 See Conrad & Bjorndal, supra note 83, at 169.
176 "Ultimately the principle reflects not so much a risk assessment based on
scientific modeling, as a risk assessment based on value choices." Macdonald,
supra note 127, at 257.
"' Evald, supra note 169, at 60.
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However, IWC may still be applying the precautionary prin-
ciple in the purely scientific (biological) sense. Uncertainty over
species abundance was perhaps the cardinal motivation for the
imposition of the 1982 moratorium.'78 The resolution establishing
the moratorium refers to the need to conduct a "comprehensive
assessment" of the moratorium's effect on whale stocks.'79 IWC's
Scientific Committee understands comprehensive assessment to
mean an "in-depth evaluation of the status of all whale stocks
in the light of management objectives and procedures." 8 ' At the
time of the moratorium's inception, empirical data indicated
that certain species populations had declined to the point that
continued commercial harvesting placed whale species at risk of
extinction. The objective of the moratorium was to prevent that
possibility. By associating the decline in population numbers
with the level of species exploitation over several decades, IWC
inferred that commercial fishing pressure was the primary cause
of the population decline.'
178 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
180 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
181 The reported discussion immediately preceding the passage of the mora-
torium resolution at the 1982 IWC meeting included the following:
The Commission had five proposals, from the Seychelles, UK, USA,
France and Australia, seeking an end to commercial whaling. In the
Technical Committee the Seychelles' proposal in the form of new
clause to paragraph 10 of the Schedule which had the effect of
introducing a three-year period for the industry to accommodate to
zero catch limits, was discussed extensively. Topics covered included
the need for rational management and sustained utilisation, the
scientific uncertainty and lack of data in assessments, past over-
exploitation and the decline in the whale stocks .... An amendment
for a two year phasing-out period was put forward and the proposal
as amended was approved by a majority vote.
In the Commission, the Technical Committee recommendation [for a
two year phasing-out] was seconded by the UK but was then amended
by the Seychelles and seconded by Sweden, St Lucia, Australia, New
Zealand and Oman to restore the three year period before
implementation, to allow for the setting of catch limits other than
zero under scientific advice, and with provision for a full review of the
effects of the decision within five years.
IWC, Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting, supra note 21, at 20 (emphasis added).
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Because of the relative certainty regarding the causal link
between intensive commercial exploitation of baleen whales and
their decline in numbers, one could argue that the decision to
impose the moratorium was not an application of the precaution-
ary principle.'82 The effort to address the population decline by
182 Considering the causal link between proposed activity and consequent harm,
there appears to be a measure of ambiguity, or perhaps ambivalence attached
to the precautionary principle.
If there is a perception that a proposed activity may cause environmental
harm, the precautionary principle suggests a preference for risk avoidance.
"[Tihe crucial point is that environmental impacts are reduced or prevented even
before the threshold of risks is reached ... and [that the principle] requires
action even if risks are not yet certain but only probable, or, even less, not
excluded." Lothar Gundling, The Status in International Law of the Principle of
Precautionary Action, 5 INT'LJ. ESTuARINE & COASTAL L. 23, 26 (1990) (emphasis
added). The implication is that precaution might be taken in some cases, even
if the presence of risks is not fully established, and even if the magnitude of the
risks is not fully known. The quotation also suggests that it is conceivable that
precaution would be necessary even in the absence of clear causation (e.g., if the
risk can not be altogether excluded.
However, there is usually a perception of an association between an activity
and a subsequent harm and provisions of a number of international instruments
have actually incorporated the language of "causality" into their precautionary
regimes. Two particular examples (both of which are concerned with water
pollution) are the Helsinki and the Oslo and Paris ("OSPAR") Conventions. The
Helsinki Convention obligates the parties to recognize
[tihe precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the
potential transboundary impact of the release of hazardous
substances shall not be postponed on the ground that scientific
research has not fully proved a causal link between those substances,
on the one hand, and the potential transboundary impact, on the
other hand ....
United Nations, Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water-
courses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, art. 2, 5(a), 31 I.L.M. 1312,
1316. (emphasis added). The OSPAR Convention, in part, addresses waste
releases from the normal operations of ships, and states that
Itihe Contracting Parties shall apply: (a) the precautionary principle,
by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken when there
are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy
introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may
bring about hazards to human health, harm living resources and
marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other
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imposing the moratorium may be regarded as protective rather
than precautionary. One could posit that if there is a causal link
between a specific activity and a consequent harm, steps should be
taken to prohibit the activity in order to prevent, or protect
against, the inescapable harm.
On biological grounds, however, it may seem more apparent
that IWC's policy of maintaining the moratorium is an application
of the precautionary principle. IWC believes that the "compre-
hensive assessment" referred to in the moratorium resolution
must include an "examination of current stock size, recent
population trends, carrying capacity and productivity."18 3 Esti-
mates of current stock size, or species abundance, form a critical
parameter for setting catch limits by implementing the CLA.' 4
These abundance estimates remain contentious, however, and
different IWC members have expressed doubts by regarding the
level of uncertainty of the data collection. 5 From these doubts,
one may conclude that, based on continuing scientific uncertain-
ties, the precautionary principle is indeed the basis for the
continued existence of the moratorium. IWC thus appears to have
applied the precautionary principle on two levels: a biological or
scientific level (uncertainties about the collection of data), and a
political or social level (uncertainty about the behavior of states).
legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence
of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects ....
Convention for the Protection of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, art. 2,
2(a), 32 I.L.M. 1069, 1076 (1993) (emphasis added).
It is also important to clarify that if the link between the activity and the
harm has been conclusively demonstrated (once the activity is carried out, the
harm is inescapable), then prevention, rather than precaution, is necessary. In
other words, once a causal link is conclusively demonstrated, a duty to institute
protective steps replaces the precautionary principle.
183 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
185 Abundance must be calculated through an application of sampling techniques
which, in turn, are dependent on valid, reliable counting methods. See supra
notes 136-37 and accompanying text. However, there is not widespread
acceptance within IWC of abundance estimates for at least some whale stocks.
See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
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V. RISK TAKING
Perhaps the continuation of the 1982 moratorium, rather
than its imposition, is a more noticeable application of the
precautionary principle, especially given the express reliance on
scientific advice regarding the moratorium's possible modifica-
tion.16 Due to the uncertainty about the status of whale stocks,
the hope is that over time science will be able to provide reliable
guidance as to whether commercial whaling can ever safely
recommence. However, this has not yet happened. Although it
remains a serious question regarding whether the precautionary
principle has risen to the level of either customary or general
international law, i"7 the principle has certainly been incorporated
into specific international instruments since 1982, sometimes in
only a hortatory fashion, but at other times in a very explicit
manner, as with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
8 8
A. International Standing
This Article's purpose is not to present an exhaustive item-
izing of all, or even most, of the different articulations of the
principle found in multiple international instruments.19 Its
186 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
187 For a discussion of the precautionary principle as general international
law, see Freestone, supra note 172, at 30. For a consideration of whether the
principle has risen to the level of customary international law, see Macdonald,
supra note 127, at 261.
18 One author asserts that the first application of the principle into the
"operative" language of an international instrument was the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety, written as an extension of, and under the auspices of, the United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5,
1992,31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Convention on Biodiversity]. See also Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, supra note 169; Jonathan Adler, More Sorry Than Safe:
Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety
Protocol, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 173, 194 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, More Sorry].
189 For comments on the incorporation of the precautionary principle into
international legal instruments or into the prescriptive policies of inter-
national organizations, see James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
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intent is only to place the principle into an approximate inter-
national context, so that a fair assessment of the principle's
currency in the lexicon of present-day international legal and
political discourse can be made. The objective of this Article is
not to reach any conclusions as to whether the precautionary
principle is indeed an established general principle of law, or
whether adherence to the principle has become accepted as part
of the customary practice of states, or whether the principle is
merely an emerging norm, absent of any binding obligation.19 °
Its purpose is simply to make clear that a debate exists between
those who believe the principle has great value in an effort to
further shape the field of international environmental law,19'
423,432 (1995); Boutillon, supra note 153, at 433; Linda 0. Coleman, Comment,
The European Union: An Appropriate Model for a Precautionary Approach?, 25
SEATLE U. L. REV. 609, 614-15 (2002); Daniel Dobos, Note, The Necessity of
Precaution: The Future of Ecological Necessity and the Precautionary Principle,
13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 375, 389 (2002); and Deborah Katz, Note, The
Mismatch Between the Biosafety Protocol and the Precautionary Principle, 13
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 949, 956 (2001).
190 See James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Status of the Precautionary
Principle in International Law, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 29 (David Freestone
& Ellen Hey eds., 1996) (stating that the precautionary principle does not
currently qualify as a general principle of international law because of a lack of
precision in formulation. However, it should probably be regarded as a
component of customary law because of its expansive use in international legal
instruments.).
191 The following remark is an illustration.
At a minimum .... there is sufficient evidence of state practice to
justify the conclusion that the principle, as elaborated in the Rio
Declaration and the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions,
has now received sufficiently broad support to allow a good argument
to be made that it reflects a principle of customary law.
PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I: FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS
AND IMPLEMENTATION 212-13 (1995). An additional statement on this side of the
debate has a similar ring: "[t]his level of academic support, coupled with recent
State practice and ICJ commentary, would appear to conclusively endorse the
principle's status as a norm of customary international law." Owen McIntyre &
Thomas Mosedale, The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary
International Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221, 235 (1997).
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and those who believe the principle is of limited value in that
endeavor because of the need for further refinement.
19 2
1. Conventions
a. The Second North Sea Conference in 1987
The first "official" adoption of the precautionary "approach,"
1 93
or at least a recognition of it in writing, occurred at the Second
North Sea Conference in 1987.1'9 The London Declaration of the
Conference stated: "a precautionary approach is necessary which
may require action to control inputs of such substances even
before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear
scientific evidence."'95 The fact that the absence of a causal link
192 The following statement, which was an early entry in the debate, is an
example.
[T]he great variety of interpretations given to the precautionary
principle, and the novel and far-reaching effects of some applications
suggest that it is not yet a principle of international law. Difficult
questions concerning the point at which it becomes applicable to any
given activity remain unanswered and seriously undermine its
normative character and practical utility ....
PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 98 (1992).
"' Use of the term "approach" in an international instrument seems to imply
that the instrument's signatories must recognize, or defer to, the wisdom of
precaution when contemplating certain activities, even if they may not be
explicitly bound to exercise precaution. In particular cases, however, the term
"approach" has seemingly not diminished the stringency of the obligation
imposed on the parties. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
194 See Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea,
Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, Nov. 25, 1987, 27
I.L.M. 835 (1988) [hereinafter Second North Sea Declaration]; Cameron &
Abouchar, Fundamental Principle, supra note 174, at 4-5. At the Conference,
North Sea riparian states met to determine ways to minimize the dumping of
solid waste into the North Sea. Id. at 4-5. The Second North Sea Declaration
states that signatories are "required" to control dumping even short of conclusive
scientific evidence of the likely harm. See Second North Sea Declaration, supra,
art. XI, 27 I.L.M. at 838.
'
95 See Second North Sea Declaration, supra note 194, art. VII, 27 I.L.M. at 838.
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does not pose a barrier to the application of the precautionary
principle is significant language because it clearly eliminates the
necessity of scientific proof as a prerequisite to the imposition of
the precautionary principle. This feature of some applications of
the precautionary principle has not been well-received, however.
In one view, under such an application, "[the] policy initiatives
derive from highly uncertain scientific theories. They are based on
the unsupported assumption that catastrophic global warming
follows from the burning of fossil fuel and requires immediate
action. We do not agree ....196
b. OSPAR Convention
Although verification of cause and effect is critical to the
scientific method, this has not obstructed the parties to other
conventions from specifying in Convention texts that waiting for
certain proof of cause and effect may bring avoidable harm to the
environment. Other conventions also outline steps that should be
taken to avoid such harm, even absent such certainty. The OSPAR
Convention, formulated to prevent marine pollution in the North
Atlantic, is a case in point.
The Contracting Parties shall apply: (a) the precautionary
principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to
be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern
that substances or energy introduced, directly or indi-
rectly, into the marine environment may bring about
hazards to human health, harm living resources and
marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with
other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no
conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the
inputs and the effects .... 197
196 PATRICK J. MICHAELS, SOUND AND FURY: THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF
GLOBAL WARMING 183 (1992) (quoting a 1991 letter from the American
Meteorological Society).
197 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069, 1076 (1993).
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Even if the risk to the marine environment is uncertain because
no causal link between the potential substances introduced into
the northeast Atlantic and the observed harm had been estab-
lished, the signatories to the OSPAR Convention apparently
believed that this risk was too great, and the possible harm too
large, to allow substance producing activities to go forward without
taking steps to prevent their harmful effects.
c. Other Conventions
One of the most often-cited examples of an instrument that
explicitly references the principle is the Rio Declaration, which
states that "[wihere there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation."'98 Other notable instruments which at least
recognize the significance of the principle, and call on states to
give it due regard when formulating environmental protections,
include the Bamako Convention on Hazardous Wastes Within
Africa,'99 and the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.200
The Bamako Convention is forthright in its statement which
requires states to implement a fairly rigorous plan to treat
hazardous material by electing to prevent or minimize the
198 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, princ. 15, 31 I.L.M.
874, 879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. An earlier statement of the principle in
the same "weak" form is located in the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on
Sustainable Development. See Report of the Economic Commission for Europe
on the Bergen Conference, U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, 1st Sess.,
Agenda Item 2(e), at 18-28, U.N. Doc. A.CONF.151/PC/10 (1990); Territo, supra
note 153, at 1354.
199 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within
Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991) [hereinafter Bamako Convention].
200 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M 849 (1992) [hereinafter
Climate Change Convention].
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production of such material through the adoption of "clean
production methods."
Each Party shall strive to adopt and implement the
preventive, precautionary approach to pollution problems
which entails, inter-alia, preventing the release into the
environment of substances which may cause harm to
humans or the environment without waiting for scientific
proof regarding such harm. The Parties shall co-operate
with each other in taking the appropriate measures to
implement the precautionary principle to pollution
prevention through the application of clean production
methods, rather than the pursuit of a permissible emis-
sions approach based on assimilative capacity assump-
tions.2 ° '
The Bamako Convention is noteworthy because it does not
weaken its prescription for action by allowing the consideration of
a cost-benefit analysis to directly enter the decision-making
process. On the other hand, the Convention on Climate Change
makes clear that such considerations are appropriate.
The Parties should take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing such measures, taking into account that
policies and measures to deal with climate change should
be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the
lowest possible cost.202
In the context of this Article, the Climate Change Convention is
a weak rendering or application of the precautionary principle, or
in this instance, precautionary "measures." This is particularly so
201 Bamako Convention, supra note 199, art. 4, 3(f), 30 I.L.M. at 781.
202 Climate Change Convention, supra note 200, at 854.
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because of the clause "or minimize the causes of climate change
and mitigate its adverse effects."2 °3 The "weakness" rests in the
suggestion that climate change can be abided if its causes are
brought under some measure of control and its deleterious
consequences are made more tolerable. In contrast, the signatories
to the Bamako Convention chose to incorporate a "strong" version
of the principle, at least in the sense of excluding a cost-benefit
component from the language.
This variation in interpretation and application of the
precautionary principle within different international legal
instruments is commonplace. One indicator of this variation is
the manner in which different instruments choose to characterize
the term "precaution." By no means do all instruments specify
"precaution" by affixing to it the term "principle."2 4 It would seem
that "no uniformity exists regarding the definition of the term
'precautionary principle' or regarding when and how the principle
should be applied [in international agreements]. Some of these
agreements merely cite to the precautionary principle, whereas
others are more specific."20 5 Indeed,
[t]he assertion and "codification" in international agree-
ments and instruments of an ill-defined, ambiguous "prin-
ciple" has created uncertainty in international law.
Uncertainty exists on several interrelated topics: the legal
and practical significance of the principle; the obligations
assumed by states ... the relation of the obligation to
scientific data; and the future shape and content of such
a principle.20 6
The precautionary principle could arguably be understood
or regarded as a treaty obligation, as a rule of customary law, as
a legal "norm," or perhaps merely as a "political guideline."2 7
203 See id.
204 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
205 Coleman, supra note 189, at 618.
206 Hickey, Jr. & Walker, supra note 189, at 424-25.
207 Boutillon, supra note 153, at 444.
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"The articulations also vary from non-binding, but fairly specific
articulations like that contained in the North Sea Protection
Declaration, °8 to articulations that are binding in form, but very
vague in content, like that in the Climate Change Convention."
20 9
Whether the precautionary principle has come to be generally
regarded as imposing a binding legal obligation on states when-
ever it is invoked in an international instrument is clearly an
important question. However, by itself, the answer may not be
sufficient to determine the posture the international community
should take when regarding the value or significance of the
precautionary principle. "[Tihere is a general consensus in the
international community that the precautionary principle is a
norm of customary international law or that it is emerging as
such."21 0 A more cautious view, but one that ends roughly in
agreement with the latter statement, is that
the imprecision of the principle classifies it as a mere
guideline. Either the formulation clearly imposes no legal
burden or, if the terms suggest a binding obligation, the
vagueness of the substance still gives rise to no liability
.... Environmental law often develops through frame-
work conventions designed to promote new norms. The
inclusion of the principle in such instruments similarly
reveals it as an emerging norm, not an obligation.21" '
20 See Final Declaration of the Third International Conference on the Pro-
tection of the North Sea, Mar. 8, 1990, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 658, 662-73
(1990), available at http://www.odin.dep.no/md/html/conf/declaration/hague.
html. Participants of the conference were to "continue to apply the precautionary
principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of
substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate even when
there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and
effects..." Id. at 661.
209 Hickey, Jr. & Walker, supra note 189, at 432. For the appropriate language
in the Climate Change Convention, see supra note 202 and accompanying text.
210 Unger, supra note 153, at 672.
211 Boutillon, supra note 153, at 446 (citing Pascal Martin-Bidou, Le Principe de
Prdcaution en Droit International de L'Environnement, in REVUE G] NgRAL DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 631, 659-62 (1999).
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2. Cases
The record is mixed in international courts regarding whether
the precautionary principle has been upheld by jurists as an
emerging norm. International jurists have made reference to the
precautionary principle in their opinions and supported the
position that states should give due regard to precaution in their
activities.2 12 Actual international court decisions, however, have
not always turned on a direct application of the precautionary
principle." 3 Two cases in particular seem to demonstrate that
international courts are far from oblivious or dismissive of the
precautionary principle. The first is the action brought in 1999 by
New Zealand and Australia against Japan before the Interna-
tional Tribunal Law of the Sea ("ITLOS").214 In their complaints,
the two plaintiffs argued that Japan had authorized its fishing
fleet to take catches of the Southern Bluefin Tuna ("SBT") in
fulfillment of Japan's Experimental Fishing Program ("EFP") at
a level that violated the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna ("CCSBT), '15 to which all three states
were parties.2 16
212 See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagrymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.),
1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 25) where the Court observed, "[tihe Court recognizes that
both Parties agree on the need to take environmental concerns seriously and to
take the required precautionary measures. . ." Id. 113. Further, "[tihe Court
is mindful that, in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and
preservation are required on account of the often irreversible character of
damage to the environment and of the limitation inherent in the very
mechanism of reparation of this type of damage." Id. 140.
213 See Unger, supra note 153, at 653-55.
214 Following this first action, Australia filed a complaint with ITLOS against
Japan on the same grounds. The two filings were reviewed and ultimately
decided jointly by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Article VII of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"). Southern
Bluefin Tuna (Austl. & N.Z. v. Japan) I, Aug. 4, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1359 (award
on jurisdiction and admissibility) [hereinafter Bluefin Tuna Case].
215 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Internet Guide to
International Fisheries Law, at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/ccsbt.htm (last
visited Feb. 14, 2005).
21 Bluefin Tuna Case, supra note 214, 39 I.L.M. at 1362-67, IT 23-24.
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Because SBT abundance had declined in 1997 by as much as
ninety percent from the peak levels of the 1960s, the CCBST
Commission set the Total Allowable Catch ("TAC") for SBT at less
than 12,000 metric tons ("mt"), with Japan subjected to the largest
reductions in its annual catch.217 New Zealand and Australia
complained that Japan's unilaterally initiated three-year EFP
violated the TAC levels set in 1994.218 Japan submitted a request
for a 3000 mt allocation for the EFP, which was not accepted by
the Commission; Japan then moved forward with a pilot experi-
mental program which produced a catch of 1464 mt in 1998.219
The plaintiffs asked the Arbitral Tribunal "to take into account
provisions of the 1993 Convention and the Parties' practice there-
under, as well as their obligations under general international
law, 'in particular the precautionary principle.' 22 °
The Tribunal took the position that "the parties should in
the circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that
effective conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm
to the stock of southern bluefin tuna."221 Further, the Tribunal
noted
scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to
conserve the stock of southern bluefin tuna . . . [and]
although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the
scientific evidence presented by the parties, it finds that
measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to
preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further
deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna stock.222
In sum, the Tribunal abrogated the right of Japan to continue with
any further illegal experimental fishing, noted that the goal of
the CCSBT was to prevent permanent depletion of SBT stocks, and
217 Id. at 1362, 22.
218 Id. at 1367, 26.
2191 d. at 1366-67, %% 24-25.
220 Id. at 1368, % 31.221 Id. at 1373, % 77.
222 Bluefin Tuna Case, supra note 214, 39 I.L.M. at 1374, %% 79-80.
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"concluded that due to the grave damage at stake, scientific
uncertainty was not a ground for failing to protect the rights of
the parties and to prevent a future depletion of the resource."223
Although the Bluefin Tuna Case seems to affirm that states
have an obligation to adhere to the precautionary principle in their
exploitation of natural resources, the record is less clear based on
previous decisions. In the Nuclear Tests Case, 224 New Zealand
asked the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to enjoin France
from underground nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 225 ICJ
ultimately dismissed the case brought by New Zealand on proce-
dural grounds, choosing not to grapple with the New Zealand
argument on the merits.226 The relevance of the September 1995
ICJ Order, however, is in the basis of the request presented by
223 Boutillon, supra note 153, at 455. One commentator sees this decision as a
"fully fledged implementation of a precautionary approach in fisheries manage-
ment." Adriana Fabra, The LOSC and the Implementation of the Precautionary
Principle, 10 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 15, 17 (1999).
224 See Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with
Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Order of Sept. 22) [hereinafter Examination of
Nuclear Tests Case].22 5 Id. at 288-92, IT 1-8.
226 In its 1995 Order, ICJ recalled how, in the original 1974 Nuclear Tests Case,
it had faced "'a situation in which the objective of the Applicant [had] in effect
been accomplished' and accordingly indicated that the 'object of the claim having
clearly disappeared, there is nothing on which to give judgment.'" Id. at 305,
61 (internal citations omitted). Because France had agreed in 1974 to cease
atmospheric testing, a ruling by ICJ had become unnecessary. Thus, in the 1995
Order, ICJ concluded that
the basis of the [19741 Judgment delivered by the Court in the
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case was consequently
France's undertaking not to conduct any further atmospheric nuclear
tests; whereas it was only, therefore, in the event of a resumption of
nuclear tests in the atmosphere that that basis of the Judgment
would have been affected; and whereas that hypothesis has not
materialized; [w]hereas, in analysing its Judgment of 1974, the Court
has reached the conclusion that that Judgment dealt exclusively with
atmospheric nuclear tests; whereas consequently it is not possible for
the Court now to take into consideration questions relating to
underground nuclear tests.
Id. 62. See also Unger, supra note 153, at 653-54.
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New Zealand, and in a dissent by two of the Court's judges. Much
of the argument submitted by New Zealand rested on the "reversal
of the burden of proof" attribute of many articulations of the
precautionary principle. "New Zealand pled that France should
prove the absolute innocuity of nuclear tests in the South Pacific
(on the Mururoa atoll) or abstain from carrying out the tests."227
"[B]y virtue of the adoption into environmental law of the 'Precau-
tionary Principle,' the burden of proof fell on a State wishing to
engage in potentially damaging environmental conduct to show
in advance that its activities would not cause contamination."2 28
Although denying any explicit legal obligation flowing from the
precautionary principle, France did take the trouble to present
data to attempt "to demonstrate the harmlessness" of the under-
ground testing.229
In its presentation, New Zealand argued for a forceful
precautionary principle in international environmental law.23 °
Two of the dissents from the majority position from Judge Palmer
and Judge Weeramantry, are worth noting.2"1 Although France
was not obligated to respond fully to New Zealand's argument
opposing underground testing, Judge Palmer believed that some
"discussion" of principles of law had taken place as a conse-
quence of New Zealand's submission. He therefore believed it
"appropriate to reach a conclusion on what the principles of law
discussed establish from the point of view of meeting the test
required to examine again the 1974 case."232 Judge Palmer then
put forward several propositions he believed were established
by the discussion that had taken place preceding the Order of
September 22. One such proposition was that "the norm involved
in the precautionary principle has developed rapidly and may
now be a principle of customary international law relating to the
227 Boutillon, supra note 153, at 452.
228 Examination of Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 224, 1995 I.C.J. at 298, 34.
229 Boutillon, supra note 153, at 452.
20 See Unger, supra note 153, at 653.
231 Id. at 653-54.
232 Examination of Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 224, 1995 I.C.J. at 412, 90
(Palmer, J., dissenting).
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environment."2 33 He also made the following cogent observation:
"The true question related to the assessment of the level of risk.
The two nations appeared to have very different approaches to
that subject."23 4
Judge Weeramantry's dissenting opinion also supported the
view incorporated in New Zealand's memorandum, which sug-
gested that the burden of proof should fall on those proposing an
activity to show that no harm to the environment would result
from that activity.235 While discussing how the international
community should proceed to prevent harm to the environment,
he noted that one approach is to place the burden of proof on those
who claim potential adverse consequences from a proposed acti-
vity by others.2 36 He then continued as follows:
The second approach is to apply the principle of environ-
mental law under which, where environmental damage
of any sort is threatened, the burden of proving that it
will not produce the damaging consequences complained
of is placed upon the author of that damage. In this view
of the matter, the Court would hold that the environmen-
tal damage New Zealand complains of is prima facie
established in the absence of proof by France that the
proposed nuclear tests are environmentally safe .... The
second approach is sufficiently well established in inter-
national law for the Court to act upon it.
237
A salient aspect of Judge Weeramantry's dissent was his belief
that a party proposing an activity with potential to cause harm
would generally be the party most likely to withhold information
regarding the risk to the environment that might facilitate a fair
judgment.
233 Id. 91.
234 Id. at 403, 67.
235 Id. at 347-48 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
236 Id. at 348.
237 Examination of Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 224, 1995 I.C.J. at 348.
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Where a party complains to the Court of possible environ-
mental damage of an irreversible nature which another
party is committing or threatening to commit, the proof or
disproof of the matter alleged may present difficulty to
the claimant as the necessary information may largely be
in the hands of the party causing or threatening the
damage.23
It thus seems fair to suggest that in Judge Weeramantry's
view the proposing party is probably better positioned to determine
whether the risk at hand was deemed sufficiently tolerable to
allow the activity to go forward.239 Needless to say, depending on
their geographical location, the parties assessing the risks from
nuclear testing may decide that in order for the activity to go
forward uncontested, those proposing the activity will need to
meet a standard of risk approaching zero; that is, a proof of
harmlessness.
To summarize, only the Southern Bluefin Tuna decision was
grounded on an interpretation or application of the precautionary
principle. In the Nuclear Testing Case, the discourse between New
Zealand and at least two of the presiding judges appears to
demonstrate that the precautionary principle has developed
beyond its characterization as a political guideline, to suggest
that it is at least approaching that of an emerging "norm of
customary international law."24 °
B. Contrasting Perspectives
The thrust for the increased appearance of the precautionary
principle into the discourse pertaining to environmental and
natural resource protection is relatively well known.
238 Id. at 342.
239 See id.
240 Unger, supra note 153, at 673. See generally McIntyre & Mosedale, supra
note 191 (discussing the precautionary principle as an emerging norm of
customary international law).
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Historically, most human societies assumed that new
activities, e.g., manufacturing a new product or chemical,
did not pose a threat to the environment. New activities
were carried out without contemplating possible adverse
effects. The disadvantages of this lack of foresight became
apparent because of the increase and expansion in
industrial production and human population growth.24'
Clearly, "activities carried out without contemplating possible
adverse effects," is an apt description of the whaling industries of
the early twentieth century, especially prior to the birth of IWC.
Despite those early, rather timid and ineffective attempts
at regulation, the virtually unrestrained slaughter of
whales continued. This slaughter led not only to the
collapse of whale stocks virtually everywhere in the
world, but drove many species to the brink of extinction.
In late 1946 the United States called for a comprehensive
international conference on whaling.242
Unfortunately, even after IWC's formation, the dire situation of
many whale stocks continued to decline and, for some stocks, it
worsened. "In 1933, when virtually no restrictions existed, 30,000
whales were killed; in 1962 under the IWC, nearly 67,000 whales
were killed."243
In this context, the motivation for the moratorium is under-
standable; although not fully accepted by all IWC members, the
moratorium vote itself (twenty-five in favor, seven against, with
five abstentions) expressed a measure of agreement that many
species were in need of protection. 244 The moratorium was
enacted because of the threat to the health, and even the survival
of certain species, despite the lack of a conclusive causal link that
241 Territo, supra note 153, at 1354 (citing Charlotte de Fontaubert et al.,
Biodiversity in the Seas: Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity
in Marine and Coastal Habitats, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 753, 838 (1998)).
242 Schiffman, supra note 13, at 311.
2 43 DAVID DAY, THE WHALE WAR 29 (1987).
244 See D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 3, at 46.
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all of the species covered by the ban were endangered by
commercial whaling.245 From the date of the moratorium to the
present, an argument has persisted regarding the degree of
certainty that must exist about the status of whale stocks (and
increasingly, specific stocks of particular species) before commer-
cial whaling can be re-instituted.246 If one simply substitutes the
term "hunting" for "fishing" in the following passage, an under-
standing of the present impasse over the moratorium becomes
more obtainable.
It is perfectly obvious that many stocks are much too
heavily fished, and that what is needed is to reduce the
amount of fishing in one way or the other. Equally, with
other stocks it is far from clear whether a recent decline
is due to too heavy fishing or to environmental factors,
and hence whether or not reductions in the amount of
fishing would improve matters. The problems of knowing
which way to move are made worse if there are strongly
entrenched forces opposing moves in one or the other
direction. This is particularly the case for the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, in which each side seems
to demand extreme degrees of certainty from their oppo-
nents.247
The question regarding a tolerable degree of certainty
involves gauging the amount of acceptable risk which is appen-
ded to a particular course of action. In the context of this Article,
245 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
24 See Gillespie, supra note 53, at 360 (quoting former Norwegian Prime Mini-
ster Gro Bruntland as stating that "[w]e have to base resource management
on science and knowledge, not on myths that some specifically designated
animals are different and should not be hunted regardless of the ecological
justifications for doing so. International cooperation is in danger if this kind of
selective animal welfare consideration is allowed to dictate resource policies.").
Id.
247 Macdonald, supra note 127, at 272 (quoting J.A. Gulland, Fishery Man-
agement: How Can We Do Better'?, in MANAGEMENT OF WORLD FISHERIES:
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXTENDED COASTAL STATE JURISDICTION 255,259 (Edward
L. Miles ed., 1989) (emphasis added)).
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the risk in question centers upon a decision to re-establish catch
limits. What is potentially at risk is the health and continued
presence of whale species. Perhaps the two most important
components involved in the calculation of risk are the probability
of the harm occurring and the magnitude of the harm. In most
calculations of risk, these two components are "multiplied"
together. When the precautionary principle is applied to ques-
tions of potential environmental harm, "the estimated risk and
effects if the risk materializes are balanced against the cost of
eliminating such risks."2" It seems that here is where one can
begin to see clearly where the impasse over the moratorium
resides.
States opposed to whaling, as well as similarly opposed
international governmental organizations ("IGOs") and non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs"), believe the potential harm
to whales (especially certain species) in the risk calculation
described above to be "very large"-possible species extinction if
catch limits are re-instituted. 249 These actors are not certain about
the probability of species extinction, but in their estimation any
probability above zero may be too large, given the magnitude of
the potential harm. Species extinction is generally understood
to be a significant harm, in terms of the health of the global
248 Territo, supra note 153, at 1354 (citing EBBESSON, supra note 172, at 120).
249 Chairman's Report of the Forty-First Meeting, 40 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N
18 (1990).
The Netherlands pointed out the earlier depletion of whale stocks and
its belief that until a management procedure which is safe from the
point of view of the conservation of whale stocks has been accepted,
the present zero catch limit should be retained. It regards objective
(ii) as the most important ....
Id. Objective (ii), one of the three management objectives proposed by the
Scientific Committee, speaks to the risk of species extinction by stating what
might be tolerable is an "acceptable risk that a stock not be depleted (at a certain
level of probability) below some chosen level (e.g. a fraction of its carrying
capacity), so that the risk of extinction of the stock is not seriously increased by
exploitation." Id.
250 See Gillespie, supra note 53, at 374-76.
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ecosystem, by the international community; the Convention on
Biodiversity seems to affirm that posture.251
The states that support limited whaling for specific species
or for indigenous populations, as well as certain IGOs and NGOs
with a similar stance, have argued that insisting on a zero-risk
2 2
policy is at best irresponsible, and at worst similar to "cultural
imperialism."253 These actors argue that the costs of eliminating
all risks of delivering an admittedly "very large" harm to whales,
should not be borne by the nationals of those few states desiring
to secure catch limits from IWC. That is, a balancing of the costs
of eliminating all risks of whale stock extinction against the
estimated risks and potentially harmful effects has not been done
fairly, and in their view, has not been done properly.
2 5 4
Whaling advocates that believe the cost-risk balancing is
flawed also believe that probability estimates of whale species
extinction have not been properly executed.255 This estimate is
partly a function of species abundance estimates, which in turn is
a function of sampling methodologies. Here, the debate begins to
focus on technical issues of marine biology. Clearly though,
whaling advocates believe the whaling opponents are "overly risk-
averse."256 Indeed, the "harms of the precautionary principle" have
2-1 Convention on Biodiversity, supra note 188,31 I.L.M. at 818. For a discussion
of the generally agreed upon threat to biodiversity, see Jonathan Adler, The
Cartagena Protocol and Biological Diversity: Biosafe or Bio-sorry? 12 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. REV. 761, 764 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, Cartagena Protocol].
252 If the probability of extinction is zero, then the risk of harm is zero.
263 See Gillespie, supra note 53, at 374.
25 See Gambell, supra note 58. "[Ilt is argued by governments such as Norway,
which has lodged objections to the ban on commercial whaling and licences its
nationals to take limited catches, that some whale stocks undoubtedly could
sustain carefully regulated and controlled catches." Id.
255 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text for contrasting views
regarding population estimate procedures.
256 Two writers have made such an observation with respect to the Cartagena
Protocol. "Rather than creating a uniform, predictable, and scientifically sound
framework for effectively managing legitimate risks, the biosafety protocol
establishes an ill-defined global regulatory process that permits overly risk-
averse regulators to hide behind the precautionary principle in delaying or
deferring approvals." Adler, Cartagena Protocol, supra note 251, at 771 (quoting
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received a good deal of attention.25 7 Although it is in reference to
the bio-technical industry, the following comment speaks well to
this issue.
While those who advocate adoption of the precautionary
principle purport to be acting in defense of public health
and the environment, the precautionary principle may
well leave us more sorry and less safe .... In the case of
biotechnology, unduly restricting the development of
GMOs [Genetically Modified Organisms] in agriculture
could have substantial negative impact on human health
and the environment, making it unclear whether adoption
of the precautionary principle would make us safer at all.
The problem is that by focusing on one set of risks-those
posed by the introduction of new technologies with some-
what uncertain effects-the precautionary principle turns
a blind eye to the harms that occur, or are made worse,
due to the lack of technological development."'
C. Harms
Clearly, the whaling debate cannot be equated with the
argument over GMOs, but it is true that the precautionary
principle appears to have been applied in both cases. Whaling
proponents would assert that IWC has indeed turned a blind eye
to the harms that occur, not due to a lack of technological develop-
ment, but rather to the failure to re-institute catch limits for
certain whale species.259 Whaling opponents could offer a cogent
Henry I. Miller & Gregory Conko, The Protocol's Illusionary Principle, 18
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 360 (2000)).
257 See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary
Principle, 33 ENV'T 4 (1991) (noting several of the principle's potentially negative
effects and advising regulators to use caution in its application).
258 Adler, More Sorry, supra note 188, at 195.
259 "More recently, there is no longer any scientific doubt that certain whale
species are abundant enough to be commercially taken, but the majority of the
IWC members still maintain that no commercial catch should be allowed."
Steinar Andresen, The Effectiveness of the International Whaling Commission,
46 ARCTIC 108, 111 (1993) (citation omitted).
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defense, however. Work performed on toxic chemicals and environ-
mental degradation that has become very influential might provide
some counter arguments; one commentator, for example, has
postulated that communities should err on the side of caution, that
is, on the side of "false positives."260
A false positive derived from a scientific validation methodol-
ogy would induce the investigator to conclude that precautionary
steps need to be taken to protect the environment, when in fact
such steps are unnecessary. Generally, if, as a consequence of a
false positive result, precautionary steps were to be taken that
were later found to have been unnecessary, the possible resultant
harm would be insignificant.2"' For example, withholding the
marketing of a new skin cosmetic cream containing a key additive
because the additive may possibly have toxic effects, might later
be established to have been unnecessary if the additive is proven
to be non-toxic. The harm produced by the precautionary measure
would be slight, perhaps only that the enhanced personal appear-
ance of some individuals would have been delayed. However, even
if some occasions warrant taking precautionary steps predicated
on a false positive result, it is also possible to produce a substantial
"benefits forgone" outcome.262 An example might be the prohibition,
or long delay, in bringing to market a manufactured pharmaceuti-
cal compound because of uncertainty regarding its possible toxic
effects. If the compound is an effective cancer cell inhibitor, and it
is later established that the compound had been delayed unneces-
sarily because of a false positive laboratory result (erroneously
indicating toxic effects), the harm of benefits forgone endured by
cancer patients would conceivably be quite large.
From a scientific validation methodology standpoint, however,
in most instances the "false negative" result is capable of producing
the greater harm.26 A false negative result would persuade an
260 Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978).
261 Id. at 220.
262 For an in-depth treatment of this issue, see Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical
Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996).
263 See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative
Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 562, 614 & n.243
(1992) (citing Page, supra note 260, at 219-20).
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investigator that precautionary measures need not be taken, when
in fact, in order to prevent the harmful consequences which would
be produced by certain actions (or lack of action), precautionary
measures should be instituted.2  It is the false negative result
that most regulatory organizations strive to prevent. Failing to
take precautionary measures can produce catastrophic conse-
quences for environmental and natural resource conservation. In
the above example, if the pharmaceutical laboratory and the
Federal Food and Drug Administration are persuaded that the
cancer cell inhibiting drug does not need further testing before
being brought to market, and it is later found that side effects
produced by the drug renders some patients comatose, the latter
consequence will be judged a harm of great magnitude. Those
parties given the responsibility to prevent such harm may be held
accountable.
IWC has been given the sometimes conflicting responsibilities
of preventing grievous harm to whale species by over-exploitation,
and of promoting the "orderly development of the whaling indus-
try."265 Presumably, the second responsibility cannot be success-
fully carried out if the first responsibility has not been met, which
makes "prevention" critical. "Prevention ... presupposes science,
technical control, the idea of possible understanding and objective
measurement of risks. Thus, the problem is no longer that of
compensating for practically inescapable losses but more of
reducing the probability of their occurrence."266 This is all the
more the case if the "loss," or the harm, is deemed irreversible.
In Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, the clause, "[wihere there
24 See Page, supra note 260, at 219.
265 ICRW, supra note 5, Pmbl., 62 Stat. at 1717, 161 U.N.T.S. at 76.
Recognizing the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding
for future generations the great natural resource represented by the
whale stocks; (clonsidering that the history of whaling has seen
overfishing of one area after another and of one species of whale after
another to such a degree that it is essential to protect all species of
whales from further overishing...
Id., Pmbl. 62 Stat. at 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. at 74.
266 Evald, supra note 169, at 58.
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are threats of serious or irreversible damage, " "' suggests that
irreversibility of a harm, if it is in fact manifest, is an attribute
that merits special attention. This becomes even more the case
if the harm is not only irreversible, but also "irreparable, irreme-
diable, incompensable, unpardonable, and imprescriptible."2 68
Irreversibility of a harm then, should perhaps be added to a cal-
culation of risk, along with the harm's probability of occurrence,
and its magnitude. 9
Accordingly, once certain harms are incurred, they cannot be
reversed, repaired, or mediated, and individuals who have the
harm imposed upon them cannot be adequately compensated.
Moreover, the parties believed to be responsible for allowing the
harm might not be pardoned. There may thus be no remedy for
certain harms, other than perhaps imposing an appropriate
punishment against the unfortunate individuals deemed responsi-
ble for its occurrence. If this is true, the best and most prudent
course of action is to adopt precautionary measures.
The over-exploitation of whales resulting in the extinction of
certain whale species is an irreversible harm in either the "shallow
ecology" or "deep ecology" sense.27 ° In this vein, whaling advocates
and opponents would agree that species extinction is irreversible
and, consequently, a harm of great magnitude. These groups dis-
agree, however, over the likelihood of species extinction occurring,
particularly for certain whale species. The dispute centers around
the degree of certainty which can or must be achieved regarding
whale species viability, particularly in the face of commercial
exploitation; that if catch limits are re-instituted, species extinc-
tion will not occur.
267 Rio Declaration, supra note 198, princ. 15, 31 I.L.M. at 879.
26 Evald, supra note 169, at 61.
269 One could take the position, however, that the irreversible character of a
harm simply adds to its magnitude.
270 "The shallow ecologists of today speak of preventing pollution, minimizing
resource depletion, and halting over-population to protect human interests. In
contrast, the deep ecologists talk of protecting nature for its own sake, apart
from human interests." Macdonald, supra note 127, at 258 (quoting James P.
Karp, Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic: Is an Ecological Conscience Evolving in Land
Development Law?, 19 ENVTL. L. 737, 739 (1989)).
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If it were agreed that some variant of the precautionary
principle is applicable to the whaling dispute, then it seems to be
a matter of whether the precautionary principle applied is "robust"
or "utilitarian," or if one prefers, "strong" or "weak."27' A robust
precautionary principle might call for "proof of harmlessness,"
which could be equated with the establishment of a zero-risk
standard, or at least a standard approaching a zero-risk policy of
species extinction. It has been suggested, however, that such a
standard would be too high. That is, it may not be helpful to
demand a "proof of harmlessness" standard in scientific studies
which attempt to establish the level of risk attached to a proposed
activity; such a standard may not be genuinely achievable through
an exercise of "pure" science. "Scientific uncertainty is inherent in
all scientific information, usually derivative of five sources of error
in the scientific method: the variables chosen, the measurements
made, the samples drawn, the models employed, and the causal
relationships inferred." '272 Expecting that science and technology
will eliminate risk probably demands too much. "[I]nsofar as the
precautionary principle asks that a technology be demonstrated to
be without risk, it is asking the impossible."273
Critics have argued that a "proof of harmlessness" standard
is much more difficult to establish than a "proof of harm" standard;
those objecting to a proposed course action (e.g., deforestation of a
hillside, producing effluent into a stream below) must often meet
the latter. This may account for why many incorporations of the
precautionary principle into international instruments apply a
"utilitarian" or "weak" version of the principle. The Biodiversity
Convention, for example, states that "where there is a threat of
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
measures to avoid or minimize such a threat."274 Stipulating that
the absence of scientific certainty should not be a pretext for
271 See supra notes 192-211.
272 Hickey, Jr. & Walker, supra note 189, at 448 (citation omitted).
273 Adler, More Sorry, supra note 149, at 206.
274 Convention on Biodiversity, supra note 188, Pmbl., 31 I.L.M. at 818.
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inaction does not have the same import as saying that full
scientific certainty must exist before certain actions can occur.
In the context of the Biodiversity Convention, a significant
portion of the international community seems to be saying, "we
should act to minimize or mitigate environmental harm (loss of
species), even in the absence of scientific certainty." In the context
of IWC, however, a much smaller portion of the international
community seems to be saying, "we should not act (remove or
modify the moratorium) without the attainment of near scientific
certainty (removal of risk to species), in order to prevent environ-
mental harm (loss of species)." In the context of the Biodiversity
Convention, signatories agree they should take action (diverge
from the status quo) to minimize risk.275 In the context of IWC,
most ICRW signatories agree that they should not act (not diverge
from the status quo) in order to minimize risk. In both cases, the
objective is to minimize risk, however, the degree of necessary
scientific certainty apparently varies. This means that the issue
is what degree of risk is deemed tolerable.
The majority position within IWC is that whale species
extinction is a harm of great magnitude, and that even a small risk
of this occurrence is too great to tolerate, particularly because
extinction is irreversible. The minority position within IWC agrees
that species extinction is a "large" harm, but disagrees with the
majority's assessment of probable extinction, especially for certain
whale species. Evidently, IWC's majority position on the 1982
moratorium 276 ascribes to a "robust," or "strong," variant of the
275 The Convention on Biological Diversity defines "biological diversity" as "the
variability among living organisms... and the ecological complexes of which
they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of
ecosystems." Convention on Biodiversity, supra note 188, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 823.
276 Apart from the General Moratorium on Commercial Whaling, the "majority
coalition" within IWC regarding aboriginal subsistence whaling (one of two types
of whaling with formally recognized quota allocations), may be softening. At
IWC's fifty-fourth Annual Meeting in Shimonoseki, Japan, the existing quota for
bowhead whales, assigned to the Alaskan Inupiats and the Chukotka people,
was not renewed. See Press Release, Japan Meeting, supra note 20. The
Commission's vote was 32 in favor and 11 against, with 2 abstentions. Id. As the
Commission requires a three-fourths majority for passage of measures of this
type, the existing bowhead quota was effectively rescinded. See supra note 20.
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precautionary principle. The majority would argue that because
This was the first time that the IWC had failed to renew such a quota since it's
inception in 1946. See James Brooke, Japan Cuts Whaling Rights for Native
Peoples of Arctic, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2002, at A4. Upon the recommendation
of IWC's Scientific Committee, the quota was removed due to a sudden large
increase in the Inupiat harvest. See Chairman's Report of the Twenty-Eighth
Annual Meeting, 28 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 22 (1977).
The quota proposal that had been voted down at the Shimonoseki meeting
was for 280 bowhead whales to be taken during the 2003-2006 period by Alaska
Inupiat and aboriginal peoples of the Chukotka region of Russia. Press Release,
Japan Meeting, supra note 20. Several of the Commission members voting
against a renewal of the bowhead quota indicated they had done so because of
dissatisfaction with IWC's failure to grant Japan a subsistence allocation for the
residents of four coastal Japanese villages. See Special Meeting Press Release,
supra note 20. See also Suhre supra note 37, at 325 (citing IWC Rejects Japanese
Plea for Whale Quota for Fishing Communities, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May
19,1998, available at 1998 WL 2284120).
At the urging of the United States, a Special Meeting of the IWC was held
in October 2002, in Cambridge to reconsider the bowhead quota. On this
occasion, the measure was passed by consensus. See Special Meeting Press
Release, supra note 20.
Although the issues are distinct, the Commission's activity regarding
aboriginal subsistence whaling may shed light on the future of the whaling
moratorium. The fact that a long standing voting "tradition" on aboriginal
quotas was apparently overthrown by Japanese maneuvering within the
Commission, and the fact that Japan is adamantly opposed to the moratorium
on commercial whaling, suggests there may be grounds for concern among
moratorium supporters. There is currently little indication that IWC is
"softening" on the moratorium issue; however, the Commission's membership is
expanding. The ability of the supporters to sustain the moratorium may well
depend on the views of additional members regarding whether particular stocks
of certain species of whales can be commercially exploited without risk to those
populations. Particularly noteworthy are the views that Iceland set forth in its
re-adherence to IWC.
Notwithstanding this, the Government of Iceland will not authorise
whaling for commercial purposes by Icelandic vessels before 2006
and, thereafter, will not authorise such whaling while progress is
being made in negotiations within the IWC on the [Revised
Management Scheme]. This does not apply, however, in case of the so-
called moratorium on whaling for commercial purposes, contained in
paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule not being lifted within reasonable
time after the completion of the [Revised Management Scheme].
See Iceland and Her Re-adherence to the Convention After Leaving in 1992,
International Whaling Commission, Oct. 2002, at http://www.iwcoffice.org/
_documents/iceland.htm.
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the potential harm from lifting the moratorium is great and
irreversible, virtually any probability of the harm's occurrence
would be intolerable.
In contrast, those in IWC's minority would argue for an
adoption of a less "robust" version of the precautionary principle
that would assign a smaller probability to the likelihood of species
extinction for certain whale species. If IWC were to adopt this
latter posture, it might be viewed as an adoption of the precaution-
ary principle in the "utilitarian" or "weak" sense; that is, as the
Biodiversity Convention posits, measures would be taken to
"avoid or minimize" risk.277 Of course, one could assert that this
is what IWC's insistence on an adequately specified inspection
and observer system really is. If this assertion were true, one
could argue that contingent on the level of specification demanded,
IWC is approaching the adoption of a less "robust" version of the
precautionary principle27
The question could be raised whether an observer might be
able to import to IWC certain actions which appear to exhibit an
application of the precautionary principle, when in fact, there is no
explicit reference to the principle in ICRW. Moreover, one could
argue that the precautionary principle is not a widely accepted
"general principle" of international law that is far from being
generally understood as binding customary law, and that those
treaties and conventions that do expressly invoke the principle
often do so in a manner that poses no binding obligation on the
part of convention signatories. Given this state of affairs, one could
very well express doubts regarding the advisability of imputing to
IWC regulatory motivations based on the precautionary principle.
It still is true that the moratorium on commercial whaling
remains in place, in large part pending completion of the RMS.
The continuation of the moratorium has a precautionary motiva-
tion.2 7 9 Further, the moratorium appears to be binding, in the
sense that it has been the practice of states, on the part of
277 See Territo, supra note 153, at 1375.
278 The recent re-admission of Iceland to the Commission may have some
relevance here. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.279 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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members as well as non-members of IWC, to comply with the
moratorium's provisions. States currently conducting whaling on
a commercial, or "de facto" commercial basis, have executed the
steps necessary to gain an exemption from the moratorium. There
seems to be at least limited support for the view that the precau-
tionary principle has gained a measure of recognition as a norm
worthy of acknowledgment and a useful addition to international
environmental law.
In conclusion, it has been said that the precautionary princi-
ple must itself be applied with forethought.
The difficulty that the international community faces
when applying the precautionary principle lies in its
value-laden character. It is not a scientific risk assess-
ment device and should not be recognized as such... It is
up to the policymaker to determine how to apply the
principle, but since it is a doctrine of international law,
differing international values create an uncertain future
for its acceptance as a policy tool.2 °
This latter statement implies that science is devoid of values. What
is unclear, however, is how science can help us to differentiate
between values and choose consistent with the most worthy ones,
and further, how values can help us to identify the most worthy
science.
280 Macdonald, supra note 127, at 277 (emphasis added).
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